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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article will focus on two major areas of inquiry in
contemporary English trust law: fiduciary standards and
substantive trust law. In Part II it will cover the trustees' exercise
of managerial discretions and of distributive discretions, before
considering the role and duties of protectors in relation thereto.
In Part III it will focus upon spendthrift and other protective
trusts, the termination of trust rules, the hesitancy to invoke
public policy to invalidate conditions imposed by settlors, and
difficulties in ascertaining whether a proper valid trust has been
created.
* Professor of Law, King's College, London University, Recorder and Barrister
of 5 Stone Buildings, Lincoln's Inn, London.
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II. FIDUCIARY STANDARDS

A. The Exercise of ManagerialDiscretionsby Trustees

English1 law makes a distinction between the investment
discretion of trustees and their other managerial discretions. The

general managerial rule is that discretions must be exercised with
the care of an ordinary prudent person in the management of his
own affairs 2 but "a paid trustee is expected to exercise a higher

standard of diligence and knowledge than an unpaid trustee."3 A
trust corporation is expected to exercise the care of a specialist in
trust administration, reflecting the fact that it holds itself out as
4
having such specialist skil.
However, when it comes to making investments, Lindley L.J.,
in a much endorsed 5 passage, stated:

The duty of the trustee is not to take such care only as a prudent
man would take if he had only himself to consider, the duty rather
is to take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he
were minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people
for whom he felt morally bound to provide. 6

On appeal to the House of Lords in this case, Lord Watson stated:
Business men of ordinary prudence may, and frequently do, select
investments which are more or less of a speculative character; but
it is the duty of a trustee to confine himself to the class of
investments which are permitted by the trust, and likewise to avoid
7
all investments of that class which are attended by hazard.

However, as Dillon L.J. has emphasized, "[W]hat the prudent man
should do at any time depends on the economic and financial
conditions of that time-not on what judges of the past, however
eminent, have held to be the prudent course in the conditions of
50 or 100 years before."8
Indeed, at first instance Hoffmann J. made it clear that
"[m]odern trustees acting within their investment powers are

1.
The law of England and Wales differs from that in other jurisdictions
within the United Kingdom, e.g., Scotland, Northern Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey,
and Guernsey.
2.
See Mendes v. Guedalla, (1862) J&H 259, 277; Re Lucking's Will
Trusts, [1967] 3 All E.R. 726, 733 (Ch.).
3.
Re Waterman's Will Trusts, [1952] 2 All E.R. 1054, 1055 (Ch.).
4.
See Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co., [1980] Ch. 515, 525; Nestle v.
National Westminster Bank, [1994] 1 All E.R. 118, 140 (C.A.).
5.
See, e.g., Cowan v. Scargill, [1985] Ch. 270, 289; Nestle, [1994] 1 All
ER at 125-26, 140.
6.
In re Whiteley, 33 Ch. D. 347, 355 (1886).
7.
Learoyd v. Whiteley, 12 App. Cas. 727, 733 (1887).
8.
Nestle, [1994] 1 All E.R. at 126.

1999]

ENGLiSH FIDUCIARY STANDARDS

entitled to be judged by the standards of current portfolio theory,
which emphasises the risk level of the entire portfolio rather than
the risk attaching to each investment taken in isolation." 9 This
led Lord Nicholls extra-judicially to write:
Investment policy is aimed at producing a portfolio of investments
which is balanced overall and suited to the needs of the particular
trust ....
Different investments are accompanied by different
degrees of risk, which are reflected in the expected rate of return.
A large fund with a widely diversified portfolio of securities might
justifiably include modest holdings of high risk securities which
would be. .. imprudent and out of place in a smaller fund ....
In
such a case it would be inappropriate to isolate one particular

investment out of a vast portfolio and enquire whether it can be
justified as a trust investment. Such a line by line approach is
misplaced. The inquiry, rather, should be to look at a particular
investment and enquire whether that is justified as a holding in the
context of the overall portfolio. Traditional warnings against the
need for trustees to avoid speculative or hazardous investments are
not to be read as inhibiting trustees from maintaining portfolios of
investments which contain a prudent and sensible mixture of low
risk and higher risk securities. They are not to be so read, because
they were not directed at a portfolio which is a balanced exercise in
risk management. 1

Significantly, in its Consultation Document on the Investment
Powers of Trustees-published in May 1996-the Treasury
accepted that trustees, within the limits of their investment
power, are entitled to invest in accordance with modem portfolio
theory. 1 While a power to "invest7 in "investments" traditionally
required the purchase of income-yielding assets, 1 2 it would seem
that, in accordance with modem portfolio theory, such a power
can be exercised to purchase a capital appreciation asset like a
painting if it is balanced in a portfolio with some high-income3
yielding assets.'
The Treasury Consultation Document also reflected modem
practitioners' views,' 4 including that of Lord Nicholls,' 5 that the
duty of a trustee when investing is simply that of the ordinary

9.
Nestle v. National Westminster Bank, 1984 NNO 1892 (N.D. 1988),
reported in Case Report, 10 TR. L. INTL. 112, 115 (otherwise unreported)
[hereinafter CaseReport].
10.
Lord Nicholls, Trustees and Their Broader Community: Where Duty,
Morality, and Ethics Converge,9 TR. L. INT' 71, 75-76 (1995).
11.
H.M. Treasury, Investment Powers of Trustees, para. 35 (May 1996).
12.
In re Wragg, [1919] 2 Ch. 58, 64-65; Tootal Broadhurst Lee Co. v.
Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1949] 1 All E.R.,261, 265.
13.
See emphasis on capital growth in Cowan v. Scarghll [1985] Ch. 270,
287, endorsed in Nestle, [1994] 1 All E.R. at 140, and in Harries v. Church
Comm'rs, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1241, 1246 (Ch.).
14.
Including those of the Law Commission and of the Trust Law
Committee who provided input for the Treasury Document.
15.
See Lord Nicholls, supranote 10, at 73.
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prudent person or specialist trustee investing for the benefit of
others, ignoring any stricter "safety first" standard that might be
regarded as additionally implicit in Lindley L.J.'s "forwhom he felt
morally bound to provide," e.g., a widow and orphans whom the
trustee would personally support if the trust fund were lost.
However, as stated by Leggatt L.J. in Nestle v. National

Westminster Bank, 16 the standard of prudence, even of a bank
trustee, is "undemanding."
The plaintiff, as remainderman
entitled to capital after the death of various life tenants,
complained that the 1922 trust fund of £53,000 should have
been worth either £1,800,000 or £1,360,000 (depending on the
percentage of equities in the fund) in 1986 when she obtained the
capital actually worth only £269,203. The Court of Appeal found
that the trustee throughout erroneously interpreted the
investment clause as much narrower than it actually was (so as
to concentrate upon a narrow range of investments within the
banking and insurance sectors) and failed to conduct regular
periodic reviews of investments until 1960. Because some life
tenants were domiciled abroad, during their lives 17 a large part of
their shares in the fund was invested in Government gilt-edged
securities exempt from income tax and from death duties, thereby
benefiting both income and capital beneficiaries, as the tax
savings on capital on deaths of the life tenants matched any
increase that would have arisen if equities had been bought
instead of fixed-interest gilts.
The court held that the onus lay on the plaintiff to prove that
a prudent trust company, knowing the proper wide scope of the
investment power and conducting regular reviews, would so have
invested the trust fund in a greater range of investments as to
make it worth more than it was worth when the plaintiff inherited
it. 18 The plaintiff had to show that, through one or both of the
trustee's mistakes, breaches of trust arose either because the
trustee made decisions which it should not have made or failed to
make decisions which it should have made, so resulting in the
trust fund suffering loss 19 (which would include the gain that
would have been made but for the wrong decisions of the
trustee). 20 The court then held that the plaintiff had failed to
21
discharge this difficult and costly burden of proof.

16.

Nestle, [19941 1 All E.R. at 142.

17.
The plaintiffs uncle died abroad in 1972, his widow died in England in
1982 after living abroad, while the plaintiff's father died abroad in 1986. See id. at
122.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

141.
133-34.
140.
127, 134.
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If a breach of trust had been proved,2 2 the court would have
been prepared to presume in favor of the plaintiff and against the
trustee that the plaintiff should not receive compensation based
on the very minimum that a prudent trustee might have
achieved, but rather should receive fair compensation 23 based on
what the average prudent trustee was likely to have achieved,
taking into account the average performance of ordinary shares
during the relevant period. However, the court was not prepared
to assume that the trustee's continued ignorance of its wide
investment powers (despite its doubts thereon) and lack of
periodic reviews until 1960 would have lead to wrong investment
decisions.
As Leggatt L.J. stated:
The fallacy is that it does not follow from the fact that a wider
power of investment was available to the bank ...
that it would
have been exercised or that, if it had been, the exercise of it would
have produced a result more beneficial than actually was produced.
Loss cannot be presumed if none would necessarily have
24
resulted.

Dillon L.J.2 5 endorsed the following dictum of Megarry V-C:
If trustees make a decision upon wholly wrong grounds, and yet it
subsequently appears, from matters which they did not express or
refer to, that there are in fact good and sufficient reasons for
supporting their decision, then I do not think that they would incur
any liability for having decided the matter upon erroneous grounds;
26
for the decision itself was right.

Thus, the plaintiffs claim apparently would fail if he cannot
disprove the trustee's allegation that unimpeachable investment
conduct could have resulted in a situation in which "right"
decisions 2 7 produced a trust fund of the low value of the actual
trust fund. 28 In essence, the plaintiff therefore must prove that
the actual value of the trust fund is one which no trustee acting
prudently could have produced, taking account of bad luck.2 9 Is

22.
For example, if the fund had been wholly invested in fixed interest
securities. See Re Mulligan [19981 1 N.Z.L.R. 481.
23.
See Nestle v. National Westminster Bank, [1994] 1 All E.R. at 127, 138,
141.
24.
See id. at 141.
25.
See id. at 128; id. at 141 (inferentially endorsed by Leggatt L.J.).
26.
See Cowan v. Scargill, [1985] Ch. 270, 294.
27.
There is no one objectively right decision at the time of decision making
but a myriad of possible right decisions.
28.
See generally Gary Watt & Marc Stauch, Is there Liability for Imprudent
Trustee InvestmentP, 1998 CoNV. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 352.
29.
Hoffmann J. and Staughton L.J. accepted that to maintain the real
value of a trust fund may require extraordinary sill or good luck. See Case
Report, supranote 9, at 115 (opinion of Hoffmann); Nestle v. National Westminster
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this not an almost impossible burden for any plaintiff to
discharge? If the trustee therefore has immunity from liability for
failure to conduct periodic reviews and for failure to ascertain the
width of its power of investment despite having doubts thereon,
the message this sends to trustees is that they do not need to
worry about their duty 30 to ascertain the width of their power of
investment (the most crucial managerial power) and to conduct
periodic reviews of investments. Did not the Court of Appeal
condone behavior that most would regard as reckless?

Should not the proper position be that breach of such duty is
per se a breach of trust rather than only a breach of trust if loss
is proved to result? Strict deterrent or preventive duties like the
"no profit" and "no conflict" rules are imposed upon trustees to

ensure the proper administration of a trust in the interests of
vulnerable beneficiaries, and are reinforced by presumptions
against trustees who are in a strong knowledgeable position and
31
in favor of beneficiaries who are in a weak ignorant position.
32
With the advent of many share indices, an appropriate index
can be chosen to determine the percentage increase to expect

over a particular period for the part of the fund that should have
been invested in equities as opposed to fixed interest securities.

However, the onus of disproving the beneficiaries' claim that a
particular percentage should have been invested in equities, as
well as the onus of claiming that an index other than the one
claimed by the beneficiaries is more appropriate in the particular

circumstances, should lie with the trustees: after all, the trustees
have only themselves to blame for this once they break their
basic duties.

Bank, [1994] 1 All E.R. at 133 (opinion of Staughton). Bad luck could lead to the
purchase of "blue chip" shares in companies which suddenly fail, e.g., Rolls Royce
Ltd, lack of clairvoyance not being negligence.
30.
On this duty see Nestle, [1994] 1 All E.R. at 123, 125, 133, 140.
31.
Equity presumes trustees to be good men and to act properly so that
they cannot take advantage of their breaches of duty. Equity looks on as done
that which ought to be done, e.g., rules on liability as constructive trustee for
profits or bribes, Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 324
(P.C.), tracing rules' presumptions against wrongdoing trustee, presumption that
wrongdoer made the most beneficial use of trust property, Wallersteiner v. Moir
(No 2), [1975] All E.R. 849, 864; Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Nant-y-Glo &
Blaina Ironworks Co. v. Grave, 12 Ch. D. 738 (1878). Deliberate or reckless
breaches of trust should be severely treated as breaches of "fiduciary duty" rather
than in the same fashion as negligent breaches of an "equitable duty of care." Cf.
Bristol & West B.S. v. Mothen, [1996] 4 All E.R. 698.
32.
This avoids the obsolete defeatist approach that "the discretion given to
the trustees to select an investment among several securities makes it impossible
to ascertain the amount of loss (if any) which has arisen to the trust fund from the
omission to invest." Shepherd v. Mouls, 4 Hare 500, 504 (1845) (per Wigram V-C).
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Then, the National Westminster Bank might not have
escaped unscathed when damned by Leggatt L.J.'s comment that
"[nlo testator, in the light of this example, would choose this bank
for the effective management of his investments,"3 3 and Dillon
L.J.'s conclusion that it was "inexcusable that the bank took no
step at any time to obtain legal advice as to the scope of its power
to invest in ordinary shares" despite having "doubts as to its
powers."3 4 The plaintiff may consider herself unfortunate in the
membership of the Court of Appeal which included no trust
specialist: Staughton and Leggatt L.J.s were common lawyers,
while Dillon L.J., although elevated from the Chancery Division of
the High Court, had, as a barrister, specialized in company and
commercial law rather than trust law.
However, the case usefully made clear that relevant
circumstances for a trustee to consider in investing trust assets
include general economic conditions; the possible impact of
inflation; the expected tax consequences of investment decisions
or strategies; modem portfolio theory for a balanced portfolio,
taking account of the expected total return from income and the
appreciation of capital; other resources of the beneficiaries as to
which the trustee should make reasonable efforts to verify the
facts; and needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and
preservation or appreciation of capital in acting fairly in making
investment decisions which have differing consequences for
differing classes of beneficiaries. This duty to act fairly confers a
wide discretion upon trustees 3s enabling them to act partially but
honestly3 6 by favoring an elderly penurious life tenant needing
income at the expense of a wealthy remainderman, especially

where the life tenant was close to the testator or settlor and the
remainderman is a more remote relative or a charity.
Trustees should take into account all these circumstances in
carrying out their "paramount duty . ..

to provide the greatest

financial benefits for the present and future beneficiaries" 3 7 or to

33.
Nestle, [19941 1 All E.R. at 142.
34.
Id. at 123.
35.
See id. at 137; see also Case Report, supranote 9, at 114.
36.
Such as trustees of a discretionary trust who are entitled to favor some
beneficiaries to the exclusion of others. See Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman,
[1998] 2 All E.R. 547, 568-69 (Oh.).
37.
Cowan v. Scargill, [1985] Ch. 270, 289. Trustees must put aside their
personal, political, or ethical views unless "all things are equal" from a financial
viewpoint when they can refuse to invest in companies whose policies or products
they find disagreeable. In the best financial interests of their beneficiaries they
may have to act dishonorably. For example, when not bound by a legally
enforceable contract to sell trust land, they are under a duty to "gazump," by
exploring a better offer and accepting it, unless it is beaten by the person to whom
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seek "the maximum return, whether by ...
income or capital
growth, which is consistent with commercial prudence... having
due regard to . . . the need to diversify, the need to balance
income against capital growth, and the need to balance risk

against return."38 While the need to diversify arises from the
duty to act as a prudent person would in investing for others, it is
embodied in section six of the Trustee Investments Act of 1961
requiring a trustee to have regard "(a) to the need for
diversification of investments of the trust, in so far as is
appropriate to the circumstances of the trust; (b) to the suitability
to the trust of investments of the description of investment
proposed and of the investment proposed as an investment of
that description."3 9
The clause "in so far as is appropriate to the circumstances
of the trust" recognizes that effect should be given to the
intentions of the settlor if, for example, clearly intending a
leasehold (a wasting asset) to be occupied by a particular
beneficiary for as long as wished, or the retention of a special
heirloom or of a controlling shareholding in a family business.
However, the paramount emphasis upon the financial interests of
present and future beneficiaries requires a contrary intent to be
express (or necessarily implied);4° for example, "no sale or other
disposition is to take place without the consent of B, who in
deciding whether or not to consent may consider her own
personal interests entirely to the exclusion of the interests of all
other beneficiaries" or "my trustees shall have no responsibility or
duty with respect to such house" being one of the testator's Hong
Kong houses where his ninety-two and eighty-six-year-old
siblings lived as licensees and were allowed to continue as such
until their deaths, by which time the house was worth much less
than would have been obtained by a speedy sale. 41
In carrying out their various managerial discretionary
functions, the trustees must personally comply with the above
duties and may not delegate those functions unless authorized by
statute or the trust instrument. 42 When acting personally, their
they had earlier orally agreed to sell the land. See generally Buttle v. Saunders,
[1950] 2 All E.R. 193 (Oh.).
38.
Harries v. Church Comm'rs, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1241, 1246 (Ch.). In the
context of charitable trusts, however, trustees should not invest in companies
whose products are inconsistent with the charitable purpose or where such
investment might hamper the charity's work by alienating potential donors or by
making potential recipients of aid unwilling to be helped. See id.
39.
Trustee Investments Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 62, § 6.
40.
See generally In re Herklots' will Trusts, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 583 (Ch.).
41.
See Hayin v. Citibank, [1987] App. Cas. 730, 748-49 (P.C.).
42.
See Turner v. Comey, 5 Beav. 515, 517 (1841); In re Speight 22 Ch. D.
727, 756 (C.A. 1882).
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duties include "the duty to seek advice on matters which the
trustee does not understand, such as the making of investments,
and on receiving that advice to act with the same degree of
prudence."4 Trustees have to obtain and consider the advice, so
that they may not automatically follow such advice: they must
exercise an independent conscious discretion 4 4 in deciding what
to sell and what to purchase or what other managerial action to
take.
As Robert Walker J. stated in Scott v. National Trust
Trustees must act in good faith, responsibly and reasonably. They
must inform themselves, before making a decision, of matters
which are relevant to the decision. Those matters may not be
limited to simple matters of fact but will, on occasion (indeed, quite

often) include taking advice from appropriate experts. It is,
however, for advisers to advise and for trustees to decide: trustees
may not (except in so far as they are authorised
to do so) delegate
45
the exercise of their discretions even to experts.
Where a trustee in good faith, acting within the scope of his
powers, does make a decision based on less-than-complete
information, the Court does not invalidate the decision unless "it
is clear that he would not have acted as he did (a) had he not
taken into account considerations which he should not have
taken into account, or (b) had he not failed to take into account
considerations which he ought to have taken into account." 46
"[It] is not enough that it should be shown that the trustees did
not have a proper understanding of the effect of their act. It must
also be clear that, had they a proper understanding of it, they
would not have acted as they did."4 7
Thus, the purported exercise of a power to transfer assets
from one pension fund to another on sale of part of a company's
business was held void by the Court of Appeal" where based on

43.
Cowan v. Scargill, 11985] Ch. 270, 289.
44.
Compare Wilson v. Turner, 22 Ch. D. 521 (C.A. 1883), with Turner v.
Turner, [1984] Ch. 100.
45.
See Scott v. National Trust, [1998] 2 All E.R. 705, 717 (Ch.) (plaintiff
complained that the Trust should not have bowed to public pressure and refused
to renew deer-hunting licenses on its land).
46.
In re Hastings-Bass, 1975 Ch. 25, 41 (C.A.).

47.

Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd. v. Evans [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1587, 1624

(Ch.). In Re Duxbury's Settlement Trusts, [1995] 3 All E.R. 145 (C.A.), three
trustees appointed a sole trustee to replace themselves under Trustee Act, 1925
§ 36, although the trust deed prevented discretionary distributive powers from

being exercised unless there was more than one trustee. The appointment was
upheld, either because the Hastings-Bass principle did not apply to § 36
appointments or the case fell outside it because the sole trustee could easily
appoint a co-trustee before attempting to exercise the discretionary powers, so
justifying appointment of the sole trustee. The latter view is preferable.
48.
Stannard v. Fison Pension Trust Ltd, 21 I.R.L.R. 27 (1992).
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an out-of-date valuation of the trust fund. In giving judgment,
Dillon L.J. happened to use the expression "might have acted
otherwise" rather than "would have acted otherwise" but in
context it does not appear that he was consciously considering
weakening the position of trustees and creating damaging
uncertainty as to what has, or has not been, validly decided.
Although having to act in good faith, responsibly and
reasonably, trustees are under no duty to give reasons for their
decisions, 4 9 and thus beneficiaries have no correlative right to
demand to know such reasons. However, if a prima facie case of
a breach of trust can be established by particularizing factual
circumstances in the statement of claim to substantiate the
alleged breach of trust (so that the claim is not struck out as a
mere "fishing expedition"), then the trustees can be compelled
either legally (through the civil litigation discovery of documents
process and by subpoenas) or practically, in order to avoid
adverse inferences being drawn, to disclose the reasoning for
their decision.50

B. Delegationby Trustees
The current position is most unsatisfactory.5 1 The effect of
sections twenty-three and thirty of the Trustee Act of 1925 is
uncertain; as a result, in the absence of express powers in the
trust instrument, it is almost impossible for trustees to manage
the trust fund in the best financial interests of the beneficiaries,
which inevitably require the use of discretionary portfolio
managers and custodians.
Before 1925, in the absence of express powers, not only
could no discretionary functions be delegated but the execution
of decisions made by trustees in the exercise of their discretion
could not be delegated unless it was a legal necessity or prudent
and in accordance with ordinary business usages to employ an
agent to carry out such task.5 2 Where agents could be employed,
there was a duty to use the common prudence that a person
would use in his own affairs in the selection of the agent, the
49,

See generally In re Londonderry's Settlement, 1965 Ch. 918 (C.A.);

Wilson v. Law Debenture Trust Corp., [1995] 2 All E.R. 337 (Ch.).
50.
See Scott v. National Trust, [1998] 2 All E.R. 705, 719 (Ch.). However,
the reasons will be immaterial if not revealing a lack of good faith, where the
trustees have an absolute or uncontrolled discretion. See Londonderry, [1965] Ch.

at 936; In re Beloved Wilkes Charity, 3 Mac. & G.440 (1851).
51.
See generally LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER No. 146, TRUSTEES'
POWERS AND DUTIES (1997) (report expected in July, 1999).
52.
See Ex parte Belchier, 1754 Arab. 218; In re Speight, 22 Ch. D. 727,
756-57 (C.A. 1882).
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terms of employment of the agent, and the supervision of the
agent.5 3 It is clear that section 23 considerably enlarges trustees'
powers:
Trustees may, instead of acting personally, employ and pay an
agent.., to transact any business or do any act required to be
transacted or done in the execution of the trust... and shall be
entitled to be allowed and paid all charges and expenses so
incurred, and shall not be responsible for the default of any such
54
agent if employed in good faith.

Section 30(1) merely replaces a provision found in the Trustee Act
1893 and the Law of Property Amendment Act of 1859, which
reflected a provision commonly found in trust instruments:
A trustee shall be chargeable only for money and securities actually
received by him notwithstanding his signing any receipt for the

sake of conformity, and shall be answerable and accountable only
for his own acts, receipts, neglects or defaults, and not for those of
any other trustee... or other person with whom any trust money or
securities may be deposited, nor for the insufficiency or deficiency
of any securities, nor for any loss, unless the same happens through

his own wiful default

55

One would expect a trust lawyer in 1926 to construe the two
sections in the light of the traditional duty to use common
prudence in the selection, employment terms and supervision of
agents and the traditional equitable meaning of "wilful default" as
encompassing not just deliberate and reckless conduct but also
negligent conduct,5 6 even though the common law (and lay)
meaning of wilful default covered only deliberate and reckless
conduct.5 7 Thus, under section 30 a trustee is not liable for the
conduct of his agent (whom he can now employ whenever he
wishes, regardless of necessity or usual business usages) unless
personally to blame by virtue of his own deliberate, reckless, or
negligent breach of duty, for example, by failing to use common
prudence in the selection, employment terms or supervision of
the agent. While there was automatic strict responsibility for the
defaults of agents employed outside the limited circumstances
before 1925, now that such circumstances have become
unlimited there is to be no strict responsibility for the defaults of

53.

See Munch v. Cockerell, 5 My. & Cr. 178 (1840); Rowland v. Witherden,

3 Mac. & G. 568 (1851); Speight, 22 Ch. D. at 762-63.
54.
Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19. § 23(1) (emphasis added).
55.
Id. § 30(1) (emphasis added).

56.

See In re Brier, 26 Ch. D. 238, 243 (C.A. 1882); In re Chapman, [1896]

2 Ch. 763, 776 (C.A.); Speight 22 Ch. D.at 745.
57.
See generally Lewis v. Great W. Ry. Co.,
Equitable Fire Ins. Co., [1925] Ch. 407 (C.A.).

3 Q.B.D. 195 (1877); In re City
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agents employed in good faith, only fault-based responsibility if
guilty of wilful default in respect of such agents.
In contrast, a 1999 lawyer could take the literal view that
once a trustee has in good faith employed an agent, thereby fixing
the employment terms, he is not thereafter to be responsible for
the default of such agent 58 (so as to be protected by the
"umbrella" of an honest appointment) or (a preferable view) he is
not to be responsible by reason only of such appointment. He
can then be responsible for loss arising from his subsequent
failure in the supervision of the agent if guilty of "wilful default,"
but perhaps only in the ordinary common law meaning of
consciously committing a breach of his duty or acting recklessly,
(i.e., indifferent whether or not it be a breach of duty) rather than
in the traditional equitable meaning.
Despite the fact that section 30 is merely a consolidating
provision, and that earlier caselaw5 9 had established that "wilful
default" in exemption clauses had the same meaning as "wilful
default" (the hallowed touchstone of liability in equity) when
surcharging the accounts of trustees and mortgagees with
amounts that should have been received but for their deliberate,
reckless or negligent conduct, 60 Maugham J. 6 1 in 1931 applied to
a trustee seeking the protection of section 30 the common law
meaning of wilful default in the commercial context of company
62
director liability, which a well-known 1925 case discussed.
63
Surprisingly, Millett L.J. recently endorsed
the view of
Maugham J., so that while "wilful default" normally includes
negligence, it does not include negligence when an exemption
clause expressly excludes liability unless the trustee was guilty of
wilful default.
A trustee who is guilty of such conduct either consciously
takes a risk that loss will result or is recklessly indifferent
whether it will or not. If the risk eventuates, he is personally

58.

See Steel v. Wellcome Custodian Trustees Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 167,

174 (Ch.) (assumption of Hoffmann J.).
59.
See supranote 56.
60.
See Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust (No. 2), [1980] 2 All E.R. 92, 97
(Ch.); In re Lucking's Will Trusts, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 866, 874 (Ch.); Chaplin v.
Young (No. 1), 33 Beav. 330, 337-38 (1863); White v. City of London Brewery Co.,
42 Ch. D. 237, 243 (C.A. 1889).
61.
See In reVickery, [1931] 1 Ch. 572 (Ch.).
62.
See In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., [1925] Ch. 407 (C.A.).
63.
See Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241 (C.A.). Because liability in
equity is on the footing of wilful default, which includes negligence, "wilful default"
in the clause "[m]y trustee shall be exempt from liability for wilful default" should

cover negligence, although in a[m]y trustee shall not be liable unless guilty of
wilful default" it should be construed according to Millett L.J. as extending only to
deliberate or reckless breaches, so that negligent liability is excluded. Is this not

illogical?
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liable. But if he consciously takes the risk in good faith and with
the best intentions, honestly believing that the risk is one which
ought to be taken in the interests of the beneficiaries, there is no
reason why he should not be protected by an exemption clause
64
which excludes liability for wilful default.
Earlier, in upholding the efficacy of a clause which exempted
a trustee from liability "unless such loss or damage shall be
caused by his own actual fraud," Millett L.J. had stated:
By consciously acting beyond their powers (as, for example, by
making an investment which they know to be unauthorised) the
trustees may deliberately commit a breach of trust; but if they do
so in good faith and in the honest belief that they are acting in the
interest of the beneficiaries their conduct is not fraudulent. So a
deliberate breach of trust is not necessarily fraudulent. 6"

Can trustees therefore, if protected by an express clause
66
exempting them from liability unless guilty of wilful default,
conduct the affairs of the trust as if they have a broader power of
investment than they actually have, and indeed delegate their
investment management function (subject to their overriding
supervision) to a discretionary portfolio manager and their titleholding function to a custodian when having no such power of
delegation? 67 Unfortunately, Millett L.J. stated, "[A] trustee who
relied on the presence of a trustee exemption clause to justify
what he proposed to do would thereby lose its protection: he
would be acting recklessly in the proper sense of the term."68
One may be forgiven for wondering what is the point of an
exemption clause if one cannot consciously rely upon it. The
point seems to be that a trustee cannot rely on an exemption
clause for consistently pursuing a policy that is in breach of
trust. In such circumstances an application should be made to

the court for more extensive powers under section 57 of the
Trustee Act as "expedient." Indeed, it is common 69 for a court to

64.
See id. at 252.
65.
Id. at 251.
66.
Section 30 of the Trustee Act, 1925 is limited by an ejusdem generis
construction to loss flowing from the depositing of trust money or securities. See
Eaves v. Hickson, 30 Beav. 136 (1861); In re Vickery, [1931] 1 Ch. 572, 582; In re
Lucking's Will Trusts, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 866, 874 (Ch.).
67.
Section 23 of the Trustee Act does not extend to distributive functions
or to fiduciary discretions like the selection of investments and decisions to sell or
lease trust property, although trustees can employ an agent for collection of rents
and day-to-day management of rented property, assumed to extend to re-letting
vacant property in In re Muffeit; 39 Ch. D. 534 (1888). The core title-holding
function of trustees cannot be delegated unless expressly authorised by the trust
instrument or a special statute.
68.
Armitage, [1998] Ch. at 254.
69.
See Anker-Petersen v. Anker-Petersen, LAW Soc'Y GAZETTE, May 1, 1991,
at 32; (1998) 12 TRUST L.I. 166.
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grant to trustees of old trust instruments powers to employ
discretionary portfolio managers and custodians, coupled where
necessary with wider investment powers.
Such is the need, in the case of large trust funds, for
discretionary portfolio managers to be employed and investments
to be held by custodians, that the Pensions Act 1995 now
authorizes this, subject to safeguards for the beneficiaries. 70
The 1996 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act
authorizes trustees of land by power of attorney for a specific or
indefinite period to delegate to any beneficiary or beneficiaries of
full capacity with an interest in possession (e.g., life interest) any
of the trustees' functions relating to the land. 7 1 The trustees then
"are jointly and severally liable for any act or default of the
beneficiary . . . if, and only if, the trustees did not exercise
reasonable care in deciding to delegate the function to the
beneficiary." 7 2 Once reasonable care was so exercised, it seems
that the trustees are protected even if the beneficiary makes a
disastrous job of things, unless one can successfully argue that
such protection only relates to their vicarious liability, so that
personal liability remains if they neglect to exercise their power
(under section 9(3) of the 1996 Act) to revoke the delegation when
prudent trustees would so act.
In respect of land or other property outside the United
Kingdom, section 23(2) of the Trustee Act 1925 authorizes the
trustees collectively to delegate any of their ministerial functions
or their fiduciary discretions to an agent, who may even subdelegate. The trustees are not to be responsible for any loss
arising "by reason only" of having made the delegation. 7 3 Thus,
personal responsibility apparently can arise for subsequent
failure to supervise the agent with common prudence.
Section 25 of the 1925 Act-as substituted in 1971 74 authorizes the trustees individually to delegate any or all of their

70.
See Pensions Act 1995, ch. 26, §§ 33-36 (Eng.) (applying only to
pension trusts). To avoid problems over whether the standard of care for selecting
an investment manager is the same as for selecting investments (to take as much
care as a prudent business person would take, not in the management of his own
affairs, but mindful that he is investing for others), section 34 (4) protects pension
trustees if they take "all such steps as are reasonable to satisfy themselves ...
that the fund manager has the appropriate knowledge and experience" and that
"he is carrying out his work competently and complying with" the diversification
and suitability of investments requirements of section 36. Liability for negligent
investment by the trustee or the fund manager cannot be excluded. •
71.
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, ch. 47, § 9
(Eng.).
72.
Id. § 9(8).
73.
See Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19, § 23(2) (Eng.).
74.
See Powers of Attorney Act 1971, ch.27, § 9 (Eng.).
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"trusts, powers and discretions" whether managerial or
distributive, so long as a power of attorney is used and its period
does not exceed twelve months. Notice must be given to the other
trustees and to anyone having power to appoint new trustees
(who may wish to consider replacing the trustee-donor of the

power). The trustee-donor remains automatically responsible for
conduct of the donee of the power. In practice, the trustees can
all exercise their individual rights so as to make an effective
collective delegation to others of their right to invest trust assets
and hold title to trust assets-but they must remember to renew
the power of attorney every twelve months.
The position clearly is unsatisfactory, so the Law
Commission (assisted by papers produced by the Trust Law
Committee) has produced a Consultation Paper"5 provisionally
recommending that trustees collectively should have broad
powers for delegating to others their managerial duties and
discretions (including power to use custodians or nominees),
subject to some safeguards, which will be clarified in a Report
(expected in July 1999) based on responses received to the
Consultation Paper. The likely outcome will be one standard of
care for all types of delegation which will cover selection,
employment terms and the supervision of the agent. That
standard will either be to exercise the care of the ordinary
prudent businessperson acting in his own affairs, or, more likely,
the care that may reasonably be expected having regard to the
nature, composition and purposes of the particular trust, the
skills which the trustees actually have, or if they are employed as
professional trustees, those skills which they either ought to have
or hold themselves out as having. This standard should also
apply to express powers of delegation unless some other standard
is expressly or impliedly specified in the trust instrument. In
addition, if, in the reasonable opinion of the trustees, delegation
was in the best interests of the trust, the trustees likely will have
power to employ agents on terms which limit the agents' liability
and which authorize actual or potential conflicts of interest of the

agents, and which authorize agents to employ sub-agents.
Connected with these broad powers of delegation that allow
flexible use of discretionary portfolio managers will be
recommendations in the Law Commission Report that trustees
should have a right to charge for their services and that trustees
of trusts (like trustees of pension trusts)7 6 should have the same
unrestricted power to make an investment of any kind as if they

75.

See LAW 6OMMN, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 146, TRUSTEES' POWERS &

DUTIES (1997).
76.
See Pensions Act 1995 § 34.
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were absolutely entitled to the assets of the trust. The
Consultation Paper made no mention of this power, but such a
recommendation was made in the Treasury Consultation
Document of May 1996,77 which was universally acclaimed by
those responding to it.
C. The Exercise of DistributiveDiscretionsby Trustees

As just seen, delegation of discretionary distributive
functions requires express authorization in the trust instrument,
except for the statutory power 7 8 enabling a trustee to delegate
whatever functions he or it wishes by a power of attorney lasting
for only a year. After all, the distributive role of the trustee is the
critical role for which the settlor has specially chosen the person
who is trustee, and much leeway is afforded to the trustee in
exercising the discretionary distributive function, whether under
discretionary trusts or under discretionary powers of
appointment, maintenance or advancement.
The exercise of managerial discretions must be in accordance
with the standards of care already considered. Indeed, even a
power "in the trustee's absolute discretion" to sell and purchase
investments likely will be subject to the implicit restriction that it
should be exercised with the standard of care of a prudent
business person or professional trust corporation mindful that it
is investing for the benefit of others,7 9 unless exemption from
such standard is provided by a general exemption clause in the
trust instrument.8 0
However, a power "in the trustee's absolute discretion" to
choose between beneficiaries of a discretionary trust or to
exercise a power of appointment or advancement need only to be
exercised honestly and for the purpose for which the power was
given. 8 1 The trustee's exercise of the power cannot be set aside
77.

See id.

78.

See Trustee Act, 1925, § 25, amended by Powers of Attorney Act 1971,

§9.
79.
See Bishop v. Bonham, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 742, 753-54 (C.A.); Bartlett v.
Barclays Bank Trust Co., [1980] Ch. 515, 536-37; Elder's Trustee & Ex'r Co. v.
Higgins (1965) 113 C.L.R. 426, 449.
80.
In Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal upheld
exemption from any liability unless caused by the trustee's own actual fraud,
although statute prevents trustees of debenture trusts and unit trusts from
exempting themselves from liability for negligence, whether ordinary or gross. See
Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, § 192 (Eng.); Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 84
(Eng.).
81.
See Gisbome v. Gisborne, 2 App. Cas. 300, 305 (1877), Tabor v.
Brooks, 10 Ch. D. 273, 277 (1878); In re Gulbenkian's Settlement, [1970] App.
Cas. 508, 518; In re Londonderry's Settlement, [1965] Ch. 918, 936 (C.A.); Edge v.
Pensions Ombudsman, [1998] 2 All E.R. 547, 568-69 (Ch.).
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simply because the judge thinks that it was unreasonable or
unfair.8 2 Exceptionally, where the trustee's action does not have
the full intended effect, then the court can interfere if "it is clear
that he would not have acted as he did (a) had he not taken into
account considerations which he should not have taken into
account or (b) had he not failed to take into
account
83
considerations which he ought to have taken into account."
Where the trustee's action does have the full intended effect but
no reasonable body of trustees properly directing themselves
would have done what the trustee did,8 4 the courts now seem
prepared to intervene and nullify such action.8s In conferring
discretionary distributive powers, draftsmen of trust instruments
86
nearly always permit the trustee "absolute discretion;"
nowadays, however, the omission of "absolute" seems unlikely to
affect the court's approach, and indeed, the presence of
"absolute" in the leading case, Gisbome v. Gisbome,8 7 was
probably not crucial to the decision therein.
After all, the essence of the matter is that the settlor intends
the trustees-not the court 8 8-to
exercise the discretions
conferred upon them and to have plenty of leeway in exercising
those discretions. Persuading persons to be trustees would be

82.

See Tabor, 10 Ch. D. at 278; Edge, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 568; In re

Steed's Will Trusts, [1960] Ch. 407, 418 (C.A.).
83.
In re Hastings-Bass, 1975 Ch. 25, 41 (C.A.).
84.
This is Wednesbury unreasonableness applicable to decisions of public
bodies that can legitimately be expected not to make a decision that no reasonable
body could have reached, which is a different matter altogether from what the
court considers unreasonable.
See Associated Provincial Picture Houses v.
Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223, 229-30 (C.A.).
85.
See Edge, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 568; Scott v. National Trust, [1998] 2 All
E.R. 705, 718 (Ch.) (accepting that trustees do not have a general duty to consult
beneficiaries who will be detrimentally affected by trustees' decision, nevertheless,
if trustees have for the last ten years paid £10,000 per annum to an elderly
penurious beneficiary, no reasonable body of trustees would discontinue the
payment without any warning and without giving the beneficiary an opportunity
to persuade the trustees otherwise). In exporting a trust by distributing the funds
to foreign trustees, the court needs "to be satisfied only that the proposed
transaction is not so inappropriate that no reasonable trustee could entertain it."
See Richard v. Mackay, [1990] 1 OTPR I; (1997) 11 TRUST L.I. 23.
86.
See, e.g., Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19, § 32-33 (Eng.)
(statutory power of advancement; protective trusts).
87.
Gisborne v. Gisborne, 2 App. Cas. 300, 307 (1877).
88.
However, if trustees do not carry out their distributive duties under a
discretionary trust, the court can intervene "by appointing new trustees, or by
authorising or directing representative persons of the classes of beneficiaries to
prepare a scheme of distribution, or even, should the proper basis for distribution
appear by itself,] directing the trustees so to distribute." McPhail v. Doulton
[1971] App. Cas. 424, 457 (Lord Wilberforce). The court has similar jurisdiction in
the case of pension trustees' powers to augment the pensions of beneficiaries.
See generallyThrells Ltd. v. Lomas, [1993] 2 All E.R. 546 (Ch.).
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difficult if the court, at the instigation of the beneficiaries, could
upset decisions it considered not to be reasonable or justifiable.
Moreover, in revealing the trustee's reasons, feelings between the
beneficiaries are likely to be embittered, as is the relationship
between the beneficiaries and the trustees, thereby prejudicing
continuity of administration by encouraging frequent retirements
of trustees when faced with beneficiaries threatening actions for
their removal. Thus, the general rule is that, so long as the
trustees exercised the relevant discretionary power honestly and
for the purpose for which it was conferred upon them by the
settlor, their exercise of the power cannot be challenged in the
courts. The presumption is that the power was duly so exercised,
such presumption being reinforced by the trustees' statement
that this was so. 89 Thus, a disaffected beneficiary can do nothing
unless he can produce some evidence that the trustees acted
dishonestly or exercised the power for a purpose beyond the
expectations of the settlor.
This showing is difficult because the facts rarely speak for
themselves so as to put the trustees on the defensive, needing to
explain or justify their conduct so as to avoid the adverse
inferences that arise from the factual situation. This contrasts
with the exercise of managerial discretions where, for example,
the significant loss in value of the investment portfolio must be
explained away, whether due to poor selection of investments for
sale and purchase, or due to lengthy fraud perpetrated by the
discretionary portfolio manager employed by the trustees. In the
area of distributive discretions, for the facts to speak for
themselves one needs an extreme situation, such as when the

trustee appoints capital to a beneficiary with whom he is having
an affair, or when the trustee commits a fraud on the power by
appointing capital to a beneficiary to enable the beneficiary to
repay a personal debt to the trustee or to make a gift of half the
appointed capital to the trustee although the trustee is not a
beneficiary.
Policing the exercise of distributive discretions becomes even
more difficult where the trust deed expressly authorizes
appointments of trust money to a trustee or the trustee's spouse,
children or grandchildren so long as there are two trustees when
such discretion is so exercised. The two trustees might then be
allowed to appoint half the capital to each of themselves, which
the settlor must have contemplated as a possibility, or to settle
the capital equally on each of their family branches, even if this

89.
In re Beloved Wilkes Charity (1851) 3 Mac. & G. 440; Palmer v. Locke,
15 Ch. D. 294, 300 (C.A. 1880); In re Gresham Life Assurance Soc'y, 8 Ch. App.
446, 450 (1872).
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ousts the family of a sibling of theirs, which is another possibility
which the settlor must have contemplated. At face value, such
conduct could accomplish a possible purpose of the settlor,
especially if the trust' deed provides that in exercising the power,
the trustees may have regard solely to their own several interests
to the exclusion of all other interests. Indeed, such provision
should make this particular power a personal power and not a
fiduciary power.9 0
In the absence of such provision, the trustees must exercise
the power as a fiduciary power "in a responsible manner
according to its purpose." 9 1 It is here that a settlor's letter of

wishes may be very helpful, but there is uncertainty over whether
beneficiaries have an absolute right to see the letter of wishes (as
well as the trust instrument) to enable them to ascertain the
settlor's purposes and to check whether the trustees are
exercising their powers properly in a manner designed to fulfil
those purposes.
At one extreme, a "letter of wishes" may be a letter regarded
as a mandatory document having to be read alongside the trust
instrument, overriding such instrument insofar as inconsistent
with it. Thus, a settlor may contemporaneously provide with a
discretionary trust instrument a letter in which he directs the
trustees to pay the income to him for the rest of his life, and
which the trustees must sign to acknowledge that they must
implement its terms; then during the settlor's life, the real trust is
in the letter, not in the discretionary trust instrument (except for
administrative powers and any powers of appointment, etc.).
At the other extreme from such a legally binding letter of
wishes that is part of the beneficial provisions of the trust is a
morally binding (as opposed to a legally signiflcant) letter of
wishes. 9 2 Such letter may be prefaced by words such as the
following:
This letter is not to be regarded as indicating the purposes for

which the powers in my trust deed have been conferred on my
trustees because I do not want my trustees to have extra legal
obligations placed upon them by this letter, so as to have to go out
of their way to justify the exercise of their powers. I believe the

imposition of such extra legal obligations would cause more
difficulties than benefits to accrue, creating greater cost and
proving likely to upset relationships between my beneficiaries.
Thus, my trustees are only to be under a moral obligation to take

90.

On "personal" and "fiduciary" powers, see discussion of Protectors in

Part II.C.
91.
Re Hay's Settlement Trusts [1981] 3 All E.R. 786, 792 (Ch.); see also Re
Beatty's Will Trusts, [1990] 3 All E.R. 844, 846; McPhail v. Doulton [1971] App.
Cas. 424, 449 (Lord Wilberforce).
92.
See P. Matthews, Letters of Wishes, 5 OTPR 176, 181, 184 (1995).
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into account the following wishes of mine and shall not be
accountable before the courts in relation to taking into account or
failing to take into account such wishes.

Assuming that such preface is not a pro forma sham inserted by
the trustees without the settlor's mind being directed to the point
to appreciate and approve it, effect should be given to the settlor's
intention as revealed therein to create a mere morally binding
letter.
Between these extremes is a letter of wishes intended to be
legally signiflcant 93 in revealing the purposes for which the settlor
conferred an extensive range of powers on the trustees who have to
exercise any discretionary power "in a responsible manner
according to its purpose."9 4 The greater the range of discretionary
powers conferred on the trustees by the trust instrument, the
greater the need for some guidelines in a letter of wishes.
To preempt the possibility that any particular term of the
letter will be regarded as a legally binding letter containing part of
the beneficial provisions of the trust instrument, it is standard
practice to preface the letter with words such as, "This letter is
not to be legally binding upon the trustees and is not to be taken
account of as part of my trust." There then follows detailed
guidance to varying extents to help the trustees fulfil the settlor's
purposes as much as possible. It seems that the proper contra
proferentem approach to trustees trying to rely on the prefatory
words to protect themselves is that the settlor did intend the
letter of wishes to be legally significant in revealing the purpose
for which he had conferred extensive discretionary powers upon
the trustees. Why else did he go to the lengths of considering his
purposes and setting them out on paper? Does he not want the
trustees to be under a legal obligation to take his wishes into
account, although not to be slavishy bound to them, especially if
circumstances have changed 9 s significantly since the letter of
wishes was written?
To minimize the impact of a letter of wishes signed by the
settlor, the trustee often merely prepares a memorandum of
wishes after extensive consultation with the settlor. However,
such a memorandum is likely to be regarded as a legally
significant letter of wishes, with the court rejecting a trustee's
self-serving attempts to rely on morally binding terminology used

93.
405.

See, e.g., Hartigan Nominees Pty. Ltd. v. Rydge (1992) 29 N.S.W.L.R.

94.
Hay's, [1981] 3 All E.R. at 792 (Ch.).
95.
These circumstances may justifiably lead the trustee not to follow the
letter of wishes. See Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co. (Bahamas) v. Ricart de
Barletta, discussed in Heather Thompson, Case Reports, 3 J. INT', TR. & CORP.

PLAN. 35 (1994); 1 BOCM 5 (1985).
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by the trustee in the memorandum as creating a situation similar
to that of a mere morally binding letter.
Like the trust instrument, a legally binding letter of wishes
must be made available for inspection and copying by
beneficiaries. 9 6 However, a morally binding letter of wishes
should not need to be made available to beneficiaries: taking, or
failing to take it into account is not intended to be a justiciable
issue where complaint can be made and a judicial adjudication
97
made thereon.
With respect to a legally significant letter of wishes there
seems no reason why the settlor should not have the option
expressly to make the letter confidential to the trustees,
especially if its contents may embarrass or embitter some
beneficiaries. This choice will make the life of the trustees easier
than would be the case if the beneficiaries had the letter available
to them and could thus pressure the trustees to justify
divergences from the settlor's wishes. 98 Confidentiality of the
letter will provide the trustees with a zone of protection, as the

letter only need be disclosed under civil litigation discovery
processes9 9 if some evidence of improper conduct by the trustees
were available to enable a particularized statement of claim to be
drawn up-and not be struck down as merely a device to enable
the discovery process to be used as a "fishing" expedition for
evidence which might support the claim.
Where the settlor has chosen to write a legally significant
letter and has not chosen to make it expressly confidential to the
trustees (until the discovery process of litigation for breach of
trust) the caselaw is unclear on whether beneficiaries have an
unfettered right to see and copy the letter of wishes.1°° In
principle, the key must be the settlor's intention. He must intend
the letter to be a trust document to be handed on with the trust
deed from trustee to trustee. After all, the trustee's discretionary
duties and powers can only be exercised for the purposes for
which the settlor conferred them on the trustees i0 as indicated
by the settlor in his legally significant letter of wishes. The settlor
also must intend to grant the beneficiaries the ability to bring the

96.

See generally SIR ARTHUR UNDERHILL & DAVID J. HAYTON, LAW OF TRUSTS

& TRUsTEEs, Article 62 (15th ed. 1995).
97.
P. Matthews, supranote 92, at 179.
98.
See generally Hartigan Nominees Pty Ltd. v. Rydge (1992) 29
N.S.W.L.R. 405.
99.
See Compagnie Financiere v. Peruvian Guano Co., 11 Q.B.D. 55, 63
(C.A. 1882).
100.

In Hartigan,29 N.S.W.L.R. 405, the three Court of Appeal judges' views

differed.
101.

See Re Hay's Settlement Trusts, [1981] 3 All E.R. 786, 792 (Ch.); Re

Beatty's Will Trusts, [1990] 3 All E.R. 844, 846 (Ch.).
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trustees to account in the exercise of the trustee's discretionary
duties and powers, since accountability of the trustee to the
beneficiaries is at the core of the trust concept.' 0 2 To give
substance to the beneficiaries' right to make the trustee account
for exercise of his discretions, surely the beneficiaries need to be
able to see the letter of wishes indicating the purposes for which
those discretions were conferred upon the trustee.1 0 3 Without
knowing such purposes, how can the beneficiaries possibly
monitor the trustee's conduct and establish a prima facie case of
improper exercise of powers? Do the beneficiaries not have a
legitimate expectation of being able to see the letter of wishes in
order to be able effectively to protect their interests, legitimate
expectations having a part to play in trust law?1° 4
In my opinion, the settlor must therefore be understood
implicitly to intend those with a right to make the trustee account
to the beneficiaries l0 5 to have the right to see the settlor's letter of
wishes (or a trustee's memorandum of such wishes). Thus, such
persons should have an unfettered right to see the letter unless

the settlor expressly made the letter confidential to the trustees;
even in the latter case, however, the letter must be disclosed in
the discovery process of litigation if a particularized breach of
trust claim can properly be pleaded. Then, as Robert Walker J.
states, "[i]f a decision taken by trustees is directly attacked in
legal proceedings, the trustees may be compelled either legally
(through discovery or subpoena) or practically (in order to avoid
adverse inferences being drawn) to disclose the substance of the
10 6
reasons for their decision."
Letters of wishes may well play a vital role where trustees
have been given the immensely wide power to add anyone in the
world (other than the settlor, his spouse and the trustees) to a
class of beneficiaries, or of objects of a power of appointment or,

102. See generally David Hayton, The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship,
in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 47 (A. J. Oakley ed., 1996).
103. Cf. Scally v. Southern Health & Soc. Serv. Bd., [1992] 1 App. Cas. 294,
306-07. The letter may or may not give the beneficiaries some insight into the
reasons for the trustees' actions, but this should be immaterial as in the case of
the provisions of the trust deed.
104. Per Robert Walker J. (as he then was) in Scott v. National Trust [1998]
2 All E.R. 705, 718 (Ch.).
105. Beneficiaries (except temporarily under a blind trust for example, for
the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Director of Serious Fraud
Office) must have a right to make the trustee account, and objects of a power will
normally be intended to have such a right, see Spellson v. George (1987) 11
N.S.W.L.R. 300, 316-17, but the settlor could expressly exclude such a right, with
the core trustee beneficiary duty-right relationship sufficing to validate a trust.
106.

Scott, [1998] 2 All E.R. at 719.
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even to appoint income or capital to anyone in the world (except
the above persons).
A discretionary trust for everyone (except four persons) is
07
void, not for uncertainty but for administrative unworkability.
The court cannot positively enforce such a trust, whether by
appointing new trustees, or by authorizing or directing
representative persons of various classes of beneficiaries to
prepare a scheme of distribution, or by itself directing the
trustees to distribute on what is obviously a proper basis for
distribution.1 0 8 Thus, positive justiciability is lacking. Neither
would one imagine that the court can negatively intervene in the
vast majority of cases where it is alleged the trustees acted
improperly in distributing money to X (not being one of the
excepted persons). After all, there seem to be no clear criteria to
enable the court to adjudicate upon the dispute once the trustee
is not obviously acting improperly for his own benefit by
distributing capital to a lover or dependant.
However, because "beneficiaries under a trust have rights of
enforcement which mere objects of a power lack. . ,"09 trustees'
powers of appointment to anyone in the world (apart from
excepted persons) have been held valid in some first instance
decisions. Templeman J. accepted 1 0 that in the case of wide
powers to add anyone to a beneficial class and of wide special
powers of appointment-and so afortioriin the case of powers of

appointment in favor of everyone (except four persons):
[T]he court cannot insist on any particular consideration being
given by the trustees to the exercise of the power ....

That

consideration is confided to the absolute discretion

of the

trustee ....

of the

The

court

cannot judge

the

adequacy

consideration given by the trustees to the exercise of the power,
and it cannot insist on the trustees applying a particular principle
or any principle in reaching a decision . . . . the settlor has no
doubt good reason to trust the persons whom he appoints

trustees.

11

1

107.
See Re Hay's Settlement Trusts, [1981] 3 All E.R. 786, 794, 796 (Ch.);
R. v. District Auditor, [1986] R. & V.R. 24.
108. These methods are detailed in McPhail v. Doulton, [1971] App. Cas. 424,
457 (1970).
109.
Hay's Settlement Thists, [1981] 3 All E.R. at 796.
110.
See In re Manisty's Settlement, [1974] Ch. 17.
111.
Id. at 25-26 (taking account of valid special powers to benefit
exceptionally wide classes (citing In re Gestetner Settlement, [1953] Ch. 672; In re
Gulbenkian's Settlement, [1970] App. Cas. 508, 524-25 (Lord Upjohn)). On the
weak position of objects of powers, see also McPhoa [1971] App. Cas. at 425, 441,
445; Lutheran Church of Australia. v. Farmers' Cooperative Executive & Trustees
Ltd. (1970) 121 C.L.R. 628, 639.
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He considered that the court could only intervene by removing
the trustees if they failed to consider exercising the power or
failed to consider a particular request from an object of the power
or acted for "reasons which I apprehended could be said to be
irrational, perverse or irrelevant to any sensible expectation of the
settlor... ."11 2 He thus considered immensely wide powers to be
3
negatively justiciable to a limited extent. 1 1
Megarry V-C shared this view in subsequently upholding the
validity of a power to appoint to anyone (other than excepted
persons). He stated that as in the case of wide special powers,
"the trustee must first consider periodically whether or not he
should exercise the power; second, consider the range of objects
of the power; and third, consider the appropriateness of
114
individual appointments."
However, how does one ascertain such "appropriateness" or
the "sensible expectations of the settlor"? According to
Templeman J., "reasonable trustees will endeavour to give effect

to the intention of the settlor, and will derive that not from the
terms of the power necessarily or exclusively, but from all the
terms of the settlement, the surrounding circumstances and their
individual knowledge acquired or inherited." 115 Clearly, a letter
of wishes can clarify the settlor's expectations by indicating the
considerations that should influence the trustees to exercise their
powers in favor of particular persons.
Such letter should be used if the trust instrument does not
provide any guidelines. Otherwise, there is a danger that a power
to appoint to anyone but an excepted class might be held to be
void, either because negative justiciability does not exist in the
particular circumstances (there being no clear criteria to enable a
judge to intervene negatively), or because positive justiciability is
required not just for discretionary trusts but also for powers.
16
After all, Warner J. in Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v. Evans'
considered that the means available for the court to enforce
discretionary trusts were also available to bring about the
exercise of powers vested in trustees. 1 17 Thus, the court exercised
an insolvent company's fiduciary power to augment the pension
benefits of its employee-beneficiaries out of a trust fund surplus
1 18
available for both the employer and its employee-beneficiaries.
There are also some earlier cases (ignored by Templeman J. and

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

In re Manisty's Settlement, [1974] Ch. at 26.
See id.
Hay's, [1981] 3 All E.R. at 793.
In re Manisty's Settlement, [1974] Ch. at 26.
[1991] 2 All E.R. 513 (Ch.).
See i& at 549.
See generally id
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Megarry V-C) indicating that if a trustee is refusing to exercise (or
even to consider exercising) a power in circumstances where no
reasonable, properly informed trustee could do other than
exercise the power in a particular way, then the court can directly
order a particular payment to be made, while also having
available the remedy of replacing the perverse trustee with a
reasonable trustee. 11 9

It may be, however, that one can justify the pension cases as
turning on the fact that the beneficiaries had earned rights to
deferred pay and had legitimate expectations of benefiting to
some extent from surpluses, or that both the pension cases and
the earlier cases concerned powers being exercised in favor of
persons who were beneficiaries and not merely objects of a power
of appointment. Because of these uncertainties, to be safe,
settlors should either use letters of wishes or expressly restrict
the trustees' powers only to benefit persons nominated in writing
by the settlor, if alive, or by beneficiaries explaining why they
believe the settlor, if alive, would have wished those persons to be
eligible to benefit.
D. The Role andDuties of Protectors
While protectors are much used in offshore trusts and are
becoming used in mainland domestic trusts, no accepted
meaning of protector1 20 exists unlike that of settlor, trustee,
beneficiary of a trust or object of a power. Clearly, however, a
protector is the holder of one or more powers capable of affecting
what the trustees are to do with the trust property. 12 1
Such powers may be classified as "persona powers, 12 2 also
125
known as "bare"123 or "beneficial"12 4 powers, or as "fiduciary,"

119. See Kiug v. Klug, [1918] 2 Ch. 67; In re Lofthouse, 29 Ch. D. 921 (C.A.
1885); In re Roper's Trusts, 11 Ch. D. 272 (1879); In re Hodges, 7 Ch. D. 754
(1878). But see cases cited suprann. 81-82; G. THOMAs, POWERS 343-67 (1998).
120. See generally Donovan W. M. Waters, The Protector.New Wine in Old
Bottles?, in TRENDS INCONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 63 (A.J. Oakley ed., 1996); Antony
Duckworth, Protectors-FishorFowl, Part1,4 J. INT'LTR. & CoRp. PLAN. 131 (1995);
Antony Duckworth, Protectors-FishorFowl, Part1, 5 J. INT'L TR. & CoRp. PLAN. 18
(1996); P. Matthews, Protectors:Two Cases, Twenty Questions, 9 TR. L. INT'L 108
(1995).
121.
See Waters, supranote 120, at 63.
122.
See UNDERHILL & HAYTON, supranote 96, at 23.
123.
See In re Gulbenkian's Settlement, [19701 App. Cas. 508, 524; C.T.
Emery, The Most Hallowed Principle-Certainty of Beneficiaries of Trusts and
Powers of Appointment, 98 LAw Q. REv. 551, 580 (1982); THOMAs, supra note 119,
at 25.
124. See In re Wills' Trust Deeds, [1964] Ch. 219, 228.
125. See Steele v. Paz Ltd., [1993-95 Manx L.R. 102, 426 (where fiduciary
powers are contrasted with "mere" or "bare" powers); Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd.
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or "vicarious"1 2 6 powers, depending upon the intention of the
settlor as it appears from the trust instrument and from the
surrounding circumstances. 12 7 The approach of the court is to
facilitate and not to frustrate intentions of settlors, so long as it
does not contravene mandatory rules of trust law whether based
on policy or on practical grounds (e.g., rules against perpetuities,
the beneficiary principle, the requirements of certainty,

justiciability and accountability of trustees to beneficiaries).
Thus, the English Court of Appeal has recently upheld exemption
clauses preventing trustees from being liable unless guilty of
actual fraud 12 8-- even if inserted in the trust instrument by the
settlor's solicitor and accountant (accepted as being in a fiduciary
relationship with the settlor who became the original trusteesso long as the settlor knew and approved of the wide exemption
clause, having been told that individuals taking on the
trusteeship would normally not accept office without such a
clause.129
Personal powers "arise where the settlor's intention is to
confer some individual benefit or protection or right of patronage
upon the donee."1 3 0 The donee is intended in his lifetime to have
full dominion so that he can discharge his legal or moral
obligations to objects of the power or use the trust fund to benefit
persons he would otherwise seek to benefit from his own
resources,1 3 1 or so that he can protect his own position,1 3 2 for

v. Evans, [1991] 2 All E.R. 513, 545-46 (Ch.). Fiduciary powers are sometimes
divided into "trust powers" where there is an obligation to exercise them with
discretion (as to how to exercise them, see, for example, McPhal v. Doulton, [1971]
App. Cas. 424, dealing with discretionary trusts) and 'mere powers" where there
is no obligation to exercise them (see In re Gulbendan's Settlement, [1970] App.
Cas. 508, 518, 524 (1968)).
126.
See In re Will's Trust Deeds [1964] Ch. 219, 228-29.
127.
See Vestey's Ex'rs v. IRC, [1949] 1 All E.R. 1108, 1131; Mettoy Pension
Trustees Ltd. v. Evans, [1991] 2 All E.R. 513, 537.
128.
See Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241 (C.A.); see also Hayim v.

Citibank, 11987] App. Cas. 730 (P.C.) (upholding clause stating that "trustee shall
have no responsibility or duty with respect to such house" occupied by very
elderly siblings until death of both siblings).
129.
See Draftsman Entitled to Protection, TIMES (London), Apr. 22, 1998
(discussing Bogg v. Roperl.
130.
Steele, [1993-95] Manx L.R. at 436 (Hegarty JA), cited in P. Games and
J. Wright, Protectors in the Isle of Man, 4 J. INTL TR. & CoRP. PLAN. 165, 170
(1995).
131.
See In re Wills' Trust Deeds, [1964] Ch.at 228.
132.
See Rawson Trust v. Perlman, 1 BOCM 135 (Bahamas Sup. Ct. Eq. No.
194) (1984); In re Z Trust, [1997] CILR 248 (unreported Cayman case discussed in
2 CHASE J. 57 (1998)).
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example, as occupier of a house owned by the trustees1 3 3 or as
director of a company controlled by the trustees.
In the case of less absolute personal powers, where the
setflor does not intend to confer such full dominion on the donee,

he will intend that there be no justiciability or accountability
beyond requiring the donee of the power to exercise the power
only in favor of the objects of the power, so as not to benefit nonobjects.13 4 Indeed, just as a personal power to appoint to anyone
in the world except the donee or his spouse is valid, 135 since
satisfying the test of administrative workability or justiciability is
not required, so it would seem a personal power to appoint such
person as the donee considers to have been friends of the
testator-settlor should be valid,' 3 6 with the donee having to
choose those within the "black" core meaning of friend or the
"grey" penumbra and being prohibited from choosing those in the
"white" outer area, the donee's decision being unchallengeable
unless no reasonable person could have grounds' 3 7 for finding
the chosen appointee to fall within the grey penumbra of meaning
of friends.
The donee of a personal power does not need to consider
periodically whether or not he should exercise his power, and
then to consider the range of possibilities within the power and
the appropriateness of particular exercises of the power. The
power is the donee's personal power to use or not use as he
wishes within the scope of the power. Whether the donee
releases the power, or never bothers to consider exercising the
power, or exercises the power irresponsibly for personal, spiteful
or malicious reasons, the court cannot intervene. As P.O.

133.
It seems the English court has power to override an elderly
beneficiary's refusal to consent to sale of an increasingly run-down house where

the beneficiary resides in an extreme case, whether to prevent remaindermen
being detrimentally affected beyond limits contemplated by the settlor or,
paternalistically, if the beneficiary's subjective view is one no reasonable person
could have. See In re Beale's Settlement Trusts, [1932] 2 Ch. 15; Law of Property

Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 30, amended

by

Trusts of Land and

Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, ch. 47., §§ 14-15 (applicable to land only).
134. See In re Gulbenkian's Settlement, [1970] App. Cas. 508, 518; Re Hay's
Settlement Trusts, [1981] 3 All E.R. 786 (Ch.); In re Wills' Trust Deeds, [1964] Ch.
219; In re Somes, [1896] 1 Ch.250.
135.
See In re Park, [1932] 1 Ch. 580 (stating that a power to appoint the
income of fund to any person "other than herself' [the donee] is valid).
136. A discretionary trust for S's friends or a fiduciary power of appointment
in favor of S's friends is void for uncertainty. See In re Gulbenkian's Settlement,
[1970] App. Cas. 508; Brown v. Gould, 1992 Ch.53, 57.
137.
See, e.g., Re Barlow's Will Trusts, [1979] 1 All E.R. 296 (Ch.) (illogically
holding, despite the cases cited supranote 136, that the testamentary provision of
a painting for each of the testatrix's friends was not void for uncertainty); Re
Gibbard, [1966] 1 All E.R. 273 (Ch.) (holding that "any of my old friends" was
precise enough).
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Lawrence J. stated, "[t]he donee is entitled to prefer one object to
another from any motive he pleases, and however capriciously he
13 8
exercises the power the Court will uphold it."
Fiduciary powers arise where the settlor intends that the
donees exercise their powers to benefit beneficiaries or objects in
139
ways appropriate to fulfil the settlor's purposes and expectations.

Except for special cases where the power (e.g., to benefit selected
persons within a class) must be exercised even though there is a
discretion as to how it must be exercised, 14 ° the power need not be
However, the donee is under a duty to consider
exercised.
periodically, or when consent is sought by the trustees, whether to
exercise the power and whether to consider the range of possibilities
within the power and only to take appropriate action 14 ' (i.e., not
irrational, perverse, or irrelevant to any reasonable expectation of
the settlor).14 2 Thus, the donee must exercise the power bona fide
for the purposes for which the settlor created it, and will be
precluded from fettering or releasing the power'4 and from
receiving any personal benefit unless authorized in the trust
instrument expressly or by necessary implication. 144 If the power
relates to investment or other managerial matters then, in the
absence of a contrary intention, the duty of care already discussed
as applicable to trustees likely should apply to fiduciary donees.
In this author's firm view it is inappropriate to regard a person
holding exclusively personal powers as a protector, for example,
where the settlor has a power of revocation or a general power of
appointment, or where a testator's widow, not being a trustee of his
testamentary trusts, has a special power to appoint the trust fund
between such of her descendants as she sees fit in her absolute
uncontrolled discretion. As the name implies, the powers of a
protector should be regarded as attached to an office-holder 145 for
the duration of the trust and for the protection of those interested
in the trust fund as beneficiaries or as objects of powers. However,

138.

In re Wright, [1920] 1 Ch. 108, 118; see supranote 134.

139. See In re Wills' Trust Deeds, [1964] Ch. at 228-29; Mettoy Pension
Trustees Ltd. v. Evans, [1991] 2 All E.R. 513 (Ch.); Steele v. Paz Ltd, [1993-95]
Manx L.R. 102, 426.
140. For example, discretionary trusts, or where trustees are to invest only
as directed by the "investment adviser" such that the adviser must act.
141. See Re Hay's Settlement Trusts, [1981] 3 All E.R. 786, 793 (Ch.).
142.
See In re Manisty's Settlement, [1974] Ch. 17, 26.
143. See In re Gibson's Settlement Trusts, [1981] Ch. 179 (holding an
undertaking to be invalid "as fettering the trustees' discretion"); In re Wills' Trust
Deeds, [1964] Ch, at 228-29.
144. See Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman, [1998] 2 All E.R. 547 (Ch.);
Sargeant v. National Westminster Bank, 61 P. & C.R. 518, 519 (1990) (holding
that "the rule that a trustee must not profit from his trust" does not apply when
he is put by the testator in the position where his interest and duty conflict).
145. This is also the view of Duckworth, supranote 120.
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circumstances can exist in which the protection is intended by the
settlor to be for her own protection for the rest of her life or for the
personal protection of the protector for the rest of his life, such as
where the settlor or the protector needs the protection of the
trustees' voting rights as a significant shareholder in a company of
which the settlor 14 s or the protector is a director or chief executive.
Here it is appropriate to consider the wide-ranging powers
that can be conferred on a protector, whether an individual or a
company or a board or a committee and whether called
"protector,"
"guardian,"
"supervisor,"
or
"management
committee." Such wide-ranging powers usually relate to

management of the trust fund but may relate to the distributive
functions of trustees. Examples of such powers'
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(i)

are:

to remove and appoint trustees;
to review the trust administration and to approve accounts;
to appoint auditors;
to agree to trustees' remuneration;
to approve self-dealing by trustees;
to apply to the court at the expense of the trust fund if bona
fide believing this to be in the interests of any unborn or
148
unascertained beneficiary;
to export the trust and change the governing law;
to trigger or cancel flight arrangements in flee clauses for
new trustees in a new jurisdiction to replace the old trustees;
to withhold consent (generally or only in specific areas) to
investment or other managerial decisions of the trustees
(including their powers to amend the administrative terms of
the trust);
to direct (generally or only in specific areas) the exercise of
trustees' investment or other managerial discretions;
to obtain and provide tax advice for the trustees;
to veto the settlor's exercise of reserved powers (e.g., if
believing the settlor to be under duress in his home
jurisdiction);
to decide whether the settlor is suffering a disability or other
misfortune so that his reserved powers should be suspended
or terminated;

(g)
(h)
(i)

(I)
(k)
(1)

(m)

146.

47

See, e.g., Von Knierem v. Bermuda Trust, 1 BOCM 116 (Bermuda High

Court, 1994).
147.
In a rare case excessive powers may be given to a protector such that
there is no true trust for beneficiaries, but only a trust of capital and income for
the settlor absolutely (albeit with power to benefit the beneficiaries simply as
objects of a power). For example, if the powers prevent the beneficiaries having
any enforceable rights against the trustees for wrongful conduct in the settlor's
lifetime (the protector having power to release the trustees from any liability for

breach of trust, such as returning the trust property to the settlor, and the
beneficiaries having no right to know they are beneficiaries or to see the trust
accounts unless the protector consents in his absolute uncontrollable discretion).
148.
So far, courts have been prepared to assume that protectors have locus
stand, presumably on the basis that recognition of their office and powers
requires this, as in the Scots case, Hill v. Hunter (1766) Mor. 16207.
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to withhold consent to distributive decisions of the trustees;
to direct the trustees to make particular distributions of
income or capital or to accumulate income;
to make or approve additions to or deletions from the class of
beneficiaries or of objects.

Of course, the existence of such express powers conferred upon a
fiduciary office holder will give rise to some necessarily implied
rights, such as seeing the trust accounts and being indemnified
out of the trust fund for properly incurred expenses.' 4 9 The
protector will normally also be given power to release any of the
protector's powers.
In ascertaining the fiduciary standards applicable to the

exercise of the above powers in default of express or necessarily
implied provisions in the trust instrument, one needs also to
consider who holds the office of protector. It may be the settlor,
or on his death, a designated relative or close friend; it may be a
beneficiary or committee of beneficiaries or a professional adviser
of the settlor or the firm in which such adviser is a partner; it
may even be a company, whether formed by the settlor or being
an independent professional company. The settlor possibly may
be the first protector, but on his death, his lawyer or an
independent corporation is to take over as protector.
In view of the infinite variety of possibilities of powers and of
persons having such powers conferred upon them by settlors, it
is clearly impossible for legislation to define a protector and
prescribe his powers and duties in any worthwhile fashion.
However, legislation could potentially provide that if a person is
expressly appointed to be "protector," then such protector has
specified powers, subject to specified duties, but subject to
contrary intention diminishing or enlarging such powers and
duties. Indeed, such legislation could try to tackle the
relationship between the protector *and the trustee so as to
protect the trustee for relying on the action or inaction of the
protector except where believing the protector's conduct to be
dishonest,' s0 but subject to the contrary intention of the settlor.
The problem with statutory default rules is that they are fine
for standard situations but not for unusual and complex
situations, where, anyhow, one would expect skilled professional
advice to be available to create a tailor-made trust. The infinite
variety of circumstances requires reliance on the skill of
professional advisers to specify the requisite powers, the duties
applicable to the exercise of such powers, the rights of the power-

149.
See Blampied v. Ram, Jan. 28, 1994, Jersey Royal Court, discussed in
Matthews, supranote 120.
150. Cf. Re Arnott, [1899] Ir. R. 201; Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan [1995] 3
All E.R. 97 (P.C.).
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holder (e.g., to remuneration and indemnity), and any exemption
from liability, whilst dealing with the relationship between the
power-holder and the trustee (e.g., a right to require meetings
with the trustee, and the trustee's protection when relying upon
the conduct of the power-holder).
In default of such express provision, one has to fall back on
rules relating to donees of powers, which need developing in the
light of modem trust practice, especially when during the settlor's
life some of the protector's powers are intended neither for the
personal benefit of the protector nor for the altruistic benefit of
the beneficial classes in the trust instrument, but rather for the
sole personal benefit of the settlor, who is not one of the
beneficiaries: he does not wish a particular shareholding to be
sold nor its voting rights exercised, except to strengthen or
preserve his position as a director or employee of the company so
that the trustees cannot dispose of the shareholding without the
protector's consent and until then must vote the shares as
directed by the protector.
A skilled draftsperson would include a provision to the effect

that, during the settlor's lifetime and so long as he was a director
or employee of X Co. Ltd., the protector's powers in respect of the
shareholding in such company should be exercised having regard
only to the interests of the settlor and to the exclusion of the
beneficiaries. After all, it is the settlor who decides how extensive
his bounty is when he makes his gift into a trust; the
beneficiaries obtain benefits along with associated burdens. In
the absence of some such provision, the presumption would be
that an officeholder with powers virtute officii has fiduciary
powers'-s that must be exercised exclusively in the interests of
the beneficiaries under the trust so that it would be a fraud on
the power to exercise the power to benefit the settlor, not being a
beneficiary. Exceptionally, if the settlor were the first protector,
the background circumstances might justify a court in holding
this particular power to be a personal power while the settlor was
protector, even if the other powers were fiduciary.
In ascertaining duties attached to power-holders, the first
question is whether the power-holder holds a particular office
fundamental to the performance of the trusts throughout the
trust period, such as the office of trustee or the office of protector.
Normally, the answer will become clear from provisions for
successor protectors and by the need for the continued

151.

See In reWills'Trust Deeds, [1964] Ch. 219.
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involvement of the protector in either or both of the trustees'
15 2
managerial or distributive functions.
Where the powers were conferred on the protector virtute
officii they are presumed to be fiduciary powers, as is also the
case if the powers were conferred on them by name when, in the
particular circumstances, they were selected as donees of the
power because they were protectors. 153 As already seen, fiduciary
powers must be exercised bona fide for the purposes for which
the settlor created the powers and cannot be released nor used
for any personal benefit of the donee. If they relate not to the
trustees' distributive functions, but to their managerial functions,
the protector likely will need to exercise such powers with the
same degree of care as the trustees. No doubt for this reason,
many offshore jurisdictions have legislation preventing persons
with fiduciary powers (but who are not trustees) from being liable
to the beneficiaries for the bona fide exercise of their powers

unless there is a contrary intention in the trust instrument.154
Exceptionally, where the first protector office-holder is the
settlor, it may be possible, in the special circumstances
canvassed in the antepenultimate paragraph, to hold that a
particular power is personal, as also may occur where the first
protector is a beneficiary with selfish interests that the settlor
must have taken into account.1 55 Thus, the beneficiary's power is
personal or, if it be fiduciary, there is a necessarily implied
authorization of a conflict of interest that allows the beneficiary,
after due consideration of other beneficiaries' interests, to
exercise
the power despite
personal
benefit
accruing
therefrom.156
Where the relevant power is conferred on a person not in the
office of trustee or of protector, the question arises whether such
power is a personal power, so that it can be ignored or released or
exercised capriciously, or a fiduciary power that cannot be so

152. See Steele v. Paz Ltd., [1993-95] Manx L.R. 102, 426 (establishing that
the court has inherent jurisdiction to appoint a person to the office of protector,
which should also be the view of English judges).
153. See ln re Wills'Trust Deeds, [1964] Ch. 219.
154. See, e.g., Bahamas Trustee Act 1998 § 81; British Virgin Island
Ordinance § 86.
155. See Rawson Trust v. Perlman, 1 BOCM 35 (Bahamas Sup. Ct. Eq. No.
194) (1984).
156. For example, in In re Z Trust, [1997] CILR 248 (unreported Cayman
case discussed in 2 CHASE J. 57, 59 (1998)), where the judge held the beneficiaryprotector's power was probably personal, but if it was fiduciary there was a
necessarily implied authority to exercise the power, thereby benefiting the
beneficiary-protector and upholding the consent of a protector committee to an
amendment of the beneficial provisions of the trust fund so as to benefit
beneficiary members of the protector committee at the expense of other
beneficiaries.
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ignored, released or exercised. Where the power relates to the
investment, management, or export of the trust fund, there is a
strong presumption that the power is a fiduciary power since the
investment, management, or export of the fund are for the
purpose of protecting and promoting the interests of the
beneficiaries.1 5 7 Where the power relates to the distributive
functions of the trustees, it seems that the power will be strongly
presumed personal if vested in the settlor at one extreme, 1 5s and
will be strongly presumed fiduciary if vested in some stranger by
virtue of an external office such as Dean of the Law School or
President of the Royal College of Surgeons. What of the situation
(1) where the power is vested in a beneficiary or (2) in some
person closely connected with the beneficiaries, such as a parent,
uncle, or person in loco parentis at some stage?
In the first case it seems likely that the power will normally
be personal, 15 9 or, exceptionally, be merely a fiduciary one where
the donee is allowed to prefer his self-interest, so long as he
considers the rival claims of other beneficiaries; 160 and, in the
case of a pension trust, the need to maintain healthy relations
between the employer-donee-beneficiary and the employeebeneficiaries. 1 6 1 In the second case, the power will be presumed
to be a personal power given to the individual "warts and all," so
that it is exercisable according to the prejudices of the individual,
so long as the power is not used for the corrupt purpose of
benefiting the individual-donee or some other person outside the
scope of the power. As James L.J. stated in Palmer v. Locke, 162
where it was alleged that such a power was a fiduciary power, "it

is fiduciary only to this extent, that the donee of the power cannot
use it for any corrupt purpose." Cotton L.J. then went on to say:
I think a great deal of inaccurate argument arises from expressions
undeveloped and not explained which may bear two senses. How
can you say that a man is properly a trustee of a power. As I

157.
Commissioner of Stamp Duties v. Way, [1942] 1 All E.R. 191 (P.C.)
(where the settlor, although one of three trustees, had the controlling power to
determine which investments were bought and sold); Vesty's Executors v. IRC,
[1949] 1 All E.R. 1108; IRC v. Schroder, [19831 Simon's Tax Cases 480 (where the
settlor's power to remove and appoint trustees or to remove and appoint members
of a committee with such power over the trustees was held to be fiduciary).
158.
See, e.g., In reTriffitt's Settlement, [1958] Ch. 852.
159.
In re Penrose, [1933] Ch. 793 (holding that the estate of a deceased
husband, who had a power to appoint to himself the testatrix's trust fund,
included such fund because her husband was competent to dispose of her fund).
160.
See supranote 156.
161.
See British Coal Corp. v. British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme
Trustees Ltd., [1995] 1 All E.R. 912, 913 (Ch.) (holding that employer can amend
pension scheme as long as the charge would "further the purposes of scheme and
ensure that the legitimate expectations of the members are met").
162.
15 Ch. 294, 299 (C.A. 1880).
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16 s
understand it, it means this, in the words of Lord St. Leonards,
that it must be fairly and honestly executed. A donee of such a
power cannot carry into execution any indirect object or acquire
any benefit for himself directly or indirectly.
That is, it is
something given to him from which he is to derive no beneficial
164
interest. In that sense he is a trustee.

Subsequently, in Re Somes,16 s where the life tenant had a power
to appoint in favor of his children and issue, with remainder in
default of appointment to a particular child, Chitty J. stated:
[t]here is no duty imposed on the donee of a limited power to make
an appointment; there is no fiduciary relationship between him and
the objects of the power beyond this, that if he does exercise the
power of appointment, he must exercise it honestly for the benefit
of an object or the objects of the power, and not corruptly for his
own personal benefit .... 166

Rather than rely on default law, a settlor should consider (with
the benefit of professional advice) what particular powers, duties,
fights and exemptions he wishes to confer on his trustees and on
any other persons. The settlor alone must decide how to deal
with his property by transferring it to trustees for the benefit of

beneficiaries, who cannot look a gift horse in the mouth but must
take the benefit with associated burdens arising from the
existence of fiduciary or personal powers-unless they choose to

disclaim their interest. There seems no reason to invoke public
policy to prevent intended personal powers from being personal
powers: if a settlor has a personal power to act capriciously and
irresponsibly he should also have power to authorize others 16 7 so

163. Topham v. Duke of Portland, 11 HLC 32, 55 (1864).
164. See Palmer v. Locke, 15 Ch. at 302-03.
165. [1896] 1 Ch. 250. In the case of a trust for children equally, but with
power for a parent to appoint to one or more of the children, to the whole or
partial exclusion of other children, the court may find a fiduciary duty not to
divest the children of their default entitlements except by a non-capricious
responsible consideration of the circumstances of the children leading to a
responsible well-considered exercise of the power. See In re Little, 40 Ch. D. 418,
422 (C.A. 1889) (stating that the power to choose among children must be for
purposes which the donor had in mind when he created the power); In re A, [1904]
2 Ch. 328 (C.A.).
166. In re Somes, [1896] 1 Ch. at 255.
167. However, trustees must owe an irreducible core content of obligations
to beneficiaries or there is no trust for the beneficiaries, but only a resulting trust
for the settlor, or absolute beneficial ownership in the so-called trustees. In
Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241 (C.A.), Millett L.J. stated:
[T]here is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustees to the
beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is fundamental to the concept
of a trust. If the beneficiaries have no rights enforceable against the
trustees there are no trusts.

But I do not accept .

.

. that these core

obligations include the duties of skill and care, 'prudence and diligence.
The duty of the trustees to perform the trusts honestly and in good faith
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to act, especially where the existence of a fiduciary power could
enable challenges to be made to its exercise, such challenges
being detrimental to the smooth running of the trust and
provoking costly litigation.
Take the power of a protector to sack the trustee and appoint
new trustees. If this be a fiduciary power does it not confer too
much leeway for the sacked trustee to allege that the sacking was
not bona fide for the purposes of protecting and promoting the
interests of the beneficiaries?'" 8 If the settlor trusts the protector
why should the protector's power not simply be personal so as
not to be open to challenge?
Indeed, the practice is developing to have the trust assets
vested in a custodian trustee-helpful, anyhow, to afford efficacy
to flee clauses-with a managing trustee exercising all managerial
and distributive discretions. If the protector sacks the managing
trustee, instructing the custodian to ignore the sacked trustee
and to act only upon the directions of the new managing trustee,
what can the sacked trustee do, particularly when it has no
assets to transfer to the new trustee and so does not need to be
told the identity of the new trustee; and, especially, if the trust
instrument provides that such a sacked trustee cannot be liable
for anything happening as a result of the appointment of its
replacement?
Custodian trusteeship is also attractive to trust corporations,
which do not want to be a managing trustee where the trust fund
mainly comprises a controlling shareholding in a company run by
the settlor or his associate so that there is plenty of potential
liability for breach of trust if the value of the shareholding
depreciates due to the trustee's failure to supervise properly the
activities of the company. A private trust company (owned and
run by the settlor or his family or associates) can be managing
trustee, while the professional trust corporation is custodian
trustee protected by provisions in the trust instrument. For
example, the instrument may provide that the custodian trustee
must concur in and perform all acts necessary to enable the
managing trustee to exercise its powers and discretions, unless
the matter in which it is requested to concur is known by it to
involve a breach of trust; but, unless the custodian so concurs, it
shall not be personally or vicariously liable for any act or default

for the benefit of the beneficiaries is the minimum necessary to give
substance to the trusts ....
Id. at 253-54.
168. See Von Knierem v. Bermuda Trust, 1 BOCM 116 (Bermuda High

Court, 1994).
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of the managing trustee, 16 9 being under no duty whatsoever to
act where no direction has been given by the managing trustee.
In England and jurisdictions with an appeal to the English
Privy Council, such custodianship arrangements will preclude
any action by the beneficiaries against the custodian trustee for a
breach of trust alleged to have arisen from such trustee's failure
to act. Liability is within the exclusive jurisdiction of equity so
there can be no question of any tortious liability for negligence at
common law. 170 English lawyers were amazed to see the British
Columbia Court of Appeal 17 ' hold a custodian trustee liable for

common law negligence to pension fund beneficiaries, especially
when the trust instrument provided that such "Trustee shall not
be responsible for the collection of any funds required by the Plan
to be paid to the Trustee . . .
[nor] shall the Trustee be
responsible for the adequacy of the Trust Fund to meet and
discharge any and all payments and liabilities under the Plan," 172
although the majority of the Court considered that this could not
affect the beneficiaries who were not a party to the trust
instrument. 173

III. SUBSTANTivE TRUST LAW

A. Protective Trusts
English law does not have the American concept of a
spendthrift trust where the interest of a beneficiary currently' 7 4
entitled to income (or to capital) is not transferable by him and is
not available to his creditors, whether directly provided for by the
terms of the trust or indirectly by virtue of a provision that the
right to income for life (or the present right to capital) shall cease
if the beneficiary (1) becomes bankrupt or (2) attempts to assign

169. See Public Trustee Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 55, § 4(2)(d) (Eng.).
170. "[T]he tort of negligence has not yet subsumed all torts and does not
supplant the principles of equity." China & South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan, [1990] 1
App. Cas. 536, 543 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.); see also Parker-Tweedale v.
Dunbar Bank, [19911 Ch. 12 (C.A.) (holding that a mortgagee's duty owed to a
mortgagor in selling the mortgaged property is not a common law negligence duty
of care but an exclusively equitable duty).
171. See Froese v. Montreal Trust Co., [1996] 137 DLR (4th) 725.
172. Id. at 730-31.
173. See id. at 739.
174. See Younghusband v. Gisborne, 1 Coll. 400 (1844), aff'd 15 W Ch. 355
(1846); Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429 (1811). "[A] future interest may be
made subject to a [valid] condition defeating it in the event of a [purported]
voluntary or involuntary alienation." In re Scientific Inv. Pension Plan Trusts,
[19981 3 W.L.R. 1191, 1196 (Ch.).
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the trust or (3) if any other event happens whereby, but for such
a provision, the beneficiary would be deprived of his right to
receive such income (or capital).
However, while a provision that conditions the beneficiary's
interest in such a manner that the occurrence of a particular
event cuts down the interest before it reaches its natural limit, a
provision granting a beneficiary an interest in income only until
he (1) becomes bankrupt or (2) attempts to assign the trust or (3)
if any other event happens whereby, but for this provision, he
would be deprived of his right to receive the benefits, is valid, as
the provision merely sets a natural limit to his interest. 17s A
trust creating such a determinable (as opposed to a conditional)
life interest is equally valid where, upon the bankruptcy or other
relevant event, a discretionary trust springs up directing the
trustees in their absolute discretion to apply the income for the
maintenance, support, or other benefit of the disadvantaged
former income beneficiary or the spouse or issue thereof or, in
default of any such spouse or issue, for such beneficiary and the
persons who would, after the death of such beneficiary, be
entitled to the income or capital of the trust fund.
Such combination of a determinable life interest followed by
discretionary trusts is so common that section 33 of the Trustee
Act 1925 expressly sets out the lengthy trusts that will be
incorporated into a trust instrument containing a reference to
property being held on "protective trusts" for B for life, with
remainders over.176 However, if B is the settlor and if the
determining event is his bankruptcy, then such event will be
ignored, so that the income for the rest of B's life will go to his
creditors; 7" events other than bankruptcy will validly determine
B's interest.' 7 8 In practice, nowadays anxious settlors
immediately create a discretionary trust under which they are
one of the beneficiaries.
However, such a disposition by a settlor, whether or not he is
a beneficiary, can be set aside 7 9 if made for the purpose of
putting assets beyond the reach of, or of otherwise prejudicing,

175.
See Re Aylwin's Trusts, 16 L.R.-Eq. 18 (1873).
176.
SeeTrustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19, § 33 (Eng.).
177.
See In re Burroughs-Fowler, [1916] 2 Ch. 251, 254-55 (holding that the
trustee in bankruptcy takes an indefeasible interest).
178.
See In re Detmold, 40 Ch. D. 585, 588 (1889) (holding valid a clause
that transferred the trust income to his wife upon the event of aft involuntary
alienation by process of law in favor of a judgment creditor of the husband).
179.
See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, §§ 423-25 (Eng.) (replacing Law of
Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 172 (replacing a Statute of
Elizabeth, 1571)) (specifying grounds on which transactions can be set aside and

that no limitation period applies); see also G. Miller, Transactions Prejudicing
Creditors, 1998 CoNv. & PRoP. LAw (n.s.) 362.
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existing ascertainable creditors or contingent creditors or even
future unascertainable creditors. 8 0 The creditor has this right
even if the settlor is not insolvent. In the event of insolvency, the
trustee in bankruptcy has this right as well as statutory rights to
set aside transactions made at an undervalue within five years of
the presentation of the bankruptcy petition.' 8 1 Dispositions made
with intent to defeat a spouse's claim to discretionary financial
relief upon divorce can also be set aside so far as necessary, 18 2 as
also is the case for dispositions made with intent to defeat
provision out of the estate
applications for discretionary financial
83
of the settlor-donor after his death.
B. PublicPolicy

Public policy as revealed in legislation deals
settlors in the preceding section hereof; however,
has invoked public policy to favor a bankrupt's
ignoring the effect of the settlor's bankruptcy as a

with devious.
the judiciary
creditors by
determinable

event under a protective trust. The judges are loath to invoke
public policy-"it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it will carry you";' 8 4 it "is a high
horse to mount and is difficult to ride when you have mounted
it."18 5 And:
To allow this to be a ground of judicial decision, would lead to the
greatest uncertainty and confusion. It is the province of the
statesman, and not the lawyer, to discuss, and of the Legislature to
determine, what is the best for the public good, and to provide for it
18 6
by proper enactments.

Remarks about "freedom of contract" are equally applicable to
"freedom of trust," public policy only being invoked to invalidate a
contract "in clear cases in which the harm to the public is
substantially incontestable, and does not depend upon the
In popular
idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds ....
language, the contract should be given the benefit of the

See In re Butterworth, 19 Ch. D. 588 (1882) (holding a settlement void
180.
because it was executed to put S's property out of the reach of unascertainable
future creditors); Midland Bank v. Wyatt, [19951 1 F.L.R. 696 (also so holding).
See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, §§ 339-42 (Eng.).
181.
182.
See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ch. 45, § 37(2)(b) (Eng.).
See Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, ch.
183.
63, § 10 (Eng.).
184.
Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252 (1824) (per Burrough J.).

185. Driefontein Consolidated Mines v. Janson, 17 T.L.R. 604, 605 (1901)
(per A.L. Smith M.R.).
186.

Fender v. St. John-Mildmay, [1938] App. Cas. 1,

(quoting Egerton v. Browlow, 4 H.L.C. 1. 123 (1853) (Parke, B.)).

10 (Lord Atkin)
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doubt."18 7 As the great Equity lawyer, Sir George Jessel M.R.,
remarked:
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those
rules which say that a given contract is void as against public
policy, because if there is one thing which more than another
public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall
be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice.
Therefore, you have the paramount public policy to consider-that

you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract. 188
Legal advisers must also take care because "public policy is a
very unstable and dangerous foundation on which to build until

made safe by decision."

189

Decisions created the rules against perpetuities in the form
of the rule against remoteness of vesting for trusts for persons
and the rule against inalienability for the few effective trusts for
non-charitable purposes.' 9 0 However, statute created the rule
against accumulations' 9 1 which the Law Commission recently
recommended should be abolished, 192 so that accumulations can
last for as long as the whole trust period. The Commission
for which a
recommended a 125-year maximum trust period
19 3
deceased settlor can rule the living from the grave.
The settlor for such period can exercise much influence
because, so long as the provisions of the trust instrument are
sufficiently certain, he can prevent relatives from benefiting if
they do not take his surname, 194 marry a person of a particular
proscribed religion or color or ethnic origin,' 9 s cease to practice19a6
particular religion, or cease permanently to reside in England,
fail to acquire a law degree, or sexually co-habit with a person of

187.
188.

Id. at 12 (Lord Atkin).
Printing & Numerical Eng'g Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R.-Eq. 462, 465

(1875).
189. Janson v. Driefontein Consol. Mines, Ltd., [1902] App. Case. 484, 507
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Lindley).
190. See generally UNDERHILL& HAYrON, supranote 96, at art. 11.
191. See Accumulations Act, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 (1800) (Eng.); Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55 (Eng.).
192. See LAW COMMISSION REPORT No. 251, The Rules againstPerpetuitiesand
Excessive Accumulations, para. 10.15 (1998).
193. See id. para. 8.13.
194. See In re Neeld, [19621 Ch. 643 (holding that the "name and arms
clauses" were valid as they were not void for uncertainty).
195. See Blathwayt v. Cawley, [1976] App. Cas. 397 (holding that a
forfeiture clause which cast off a beneficiary if he was or became a Catholic was
not void for uncertainty or as against public policy). The Race Relations Act 1976,
like the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, does not apply to private trusts.
196. See In re Gape, [1952] Ch. 418, 426 (upholding clause that required
beneficiary to permanently reside in England).
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the same sex or opposite sex. Conditions which seek to
undermine marriage 19 7 (but not remarriage) 198 are void for public
policy, as are conditions designed to separate parent from
child.19 9
In the case of charitable trusts where, except for trusts for
the relief of poverty, the test of public benefit must positively be
satisfied, there is more scope for judicial intervention, at least in
regard to educational trusts and miscellaneous trusts for the
public good. Thus, an alleged charitable trust for a museum or
gallery of objects that were mainly junl was held non-charitable
and void, 2° ° but in the case of religious charitable trusts it seems
impossible to challenge allegedly religious writings as junk unless
20
subversive of all morality. '
In the case of private trusts complying with the rule against
perpetuity, the beneficiary principle, and the three certainties,
freedom of trust, like freedom of contract, is a sacred principle so
that the judiciary should not make the trust or a provision

thereof void unless there is a clear public policy justification
indicated by Parliament 2 2 or by earlier caselaw not based on
20 3
obsolete social attitudes.
Recently, in Armitage v. Nurse,2 ° 4 it was submitted that "a
trustee exemption clause which purports to exclude all liability
except for actual fraud is void, either for repugnancy or as
contrary to public policy."20 Millett L.J. (as he then was) rejected
this assertion in a reserved judgment in which the two other
Lords Justices simply concurred:

197. See In re Hope Johnstone, [1904] 1 Ch. 470; In re Lovell, [1920] 1 Ch.
122, 126 (stating that "the law of England does not allow provisions made in
contemplation of a future separation between husband and wife'); In re Johnson's
Will Trusts, [1967] Ch. 387, 395 (invalidating a clause in a will that would "tend to
encourage the daughter to separate from her husband" or to divorce him).
198. See Allen v. Jackson, 1 Ch. D. 399 (1875).
199.
See In re Sandbrook, [1912] 2 Ch. 471; In re Borwick, [1933] Ch. 657;
Blathwayt v. Cawley, [1976] App. Cas. 397.
200. See In re Pinion, [1965] Ch. 85.
201. See Thornton v. Howe, 31 Beav. 14 (1826); In re Watson, [1973] 1
W.L.R. 1472 (Oh.). This is a hangover from the old Mortmain Acts that ensured
charitable religious trusts made on death or within a year of death were void (not
valid as they are today), thereby encouraging the judges so to find, and so to
benefit the deceased's family.
202. Indeed Parliament sometimes expressly abolishes public policy rules,
including, for example, those voiding trusts for future illegitimate children. See
Family Law Reform Act 1969, ch. 46, § 15(7) (Eng.).
203. "Only in a case where there is still a generally accepted moral code can
the court refuse to enforce rights in such a way as to offend that generally
accepted code.' Stephens v. Avery, [1988] 2 All E.R. 477, 481; see also Tinsley v.
Milligan, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 340.
204. [1998] Ch. 241 (C.A.).
205. Id. at 251.
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[There] is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustees to
the beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is fundamental to
the concept of a trust. If the beneficiaries have no rights
enforceable against the trustees there are no trusts. But I do not
accept that these core obligations include the duties of skill and
care, prudence and diligence. The duty of the trustees to perform
the trusts honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the
beneficiaries is the minimum necessary to give substance to the
trusts ....
[It] must be acknowledged that the view is widely held
that these clauses have gone too far, and that trustees ...

should

not be able to rely on a trustee exemption clause which purports to
absolve a trustee from liability for his own fraud, wilful misconduct
or gross negligence ....
If such clauses ...
206
.. this should be done by Parliament.

are to be denied effect

Parliament had already legislated that trustees of unit trusts and
of debenture trusts (and pension trustees in their investment

function)20 7 could not exempt themselves from liability for
negligence, but it would have been open to the Court of Appeal to

find that ordinary trustees as a matter of public policy could not
exempt themselves from liability for gross negligence, as opposed
to ordinary negligence.
There is support for this in American 2 o8 and Scottish 20 9
caselaw, but Millett L.J. doubted whether any intelligible

distinction existed between ordinary and gross negligence;
counsel, unfortunately, failed to cite to him the English cases
accepting this distinction in the law of bailment.2 10 Thus, Millett
L.J. considered that the Court had a stark choice between

choosing either to outlaw or to accept all clauses exempting
trustees from liability for negligence, because no serious
consideration could be given to the option of only outlawing
exemption from liability for gross negligence.
Some useful guidance does emerge from the insistence of
Millett L.J. that private trusts require at their core beneficiaries
with rights against the trustees, although he naturally prefers to
regard this not as a matter of public policy but as inherent in the
fundamental trust concept. 21 1 A provision purporting to oust

206. Id. at 253-54, 256.
207. See Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, § 192 (Eng.) (discussing liability of
trustees of debentures); Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 84 (Eng.)
(discussing liability of trustees of unit trusts); Pensions Act 1995, ch. 26, § 33
(Eng.) (discussing liability of trustees of pension funds).
208. See Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1918) ("[A]
trustee cannot contract for immunity from liability for acts of gross negligence or
for acts done in bad faith.").
209.
See Lutea Trustees Ltd. v. Orbis Trustees Guernsey Ltd., [1997] SCLR
735.
210. See Giblin v. McMullen, [18681 2 L.R.-P.C, 317 (discussing differing
levels of negligence in bailment); Beal v. South Devon Ry. Co., 3 H&C 337 (1864).
211.
See generallyArmitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241.
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such rights therefore would either be void as repugnant to the
trust concept or would require the beneficiaries to be
recharacterized merely as objects of a power. Thus, if a trust
governed by English law stipulated that the beneficiaries had no
right to see the trust accounts and no right to make the trustees
account for their conduct as trustees, a court would either treat
this stipulation as void for repugnancy or, more likely, would give
effect to the settlor's intentions by finding there to be a resulting
trust in favor of the settlor but with the trustees having power
(until countermanded by the settlor) to make distributions to the
beneficiaries recharacterized merely as objects of a power.
In the cases of Cayman-exempted trusts (in which all rights
and remedies of "beneficiaries" are vested in the Registrar
answerable to no one except the Governor)2 12 and Cayman STAR
trusts (in which a "beneficiary," unless appointed an 'enforcer,"
does not have standing to enforce the trust or an enforceable
right against a trustee or an enforcer, or an enforceable right to
the trust property), 2 13 assuming no "beneficiary" is an "enforcer,"
the English courts are likely to find a resulting trust of English
property in favor of the settlor, with the trustees having a
revocable power to benefit the beneficiaries as objects of a power.
Thus, there arises the concept of a "limping trust" valid as a
proper trust for beneficiaries in one jurisdiction, but ranking as a
resulting trust for the settlor with a power to benefit beneficiaries
as objects in another jurisdiction.
A "limping trust" can also arise in respect of trusts of some
English property governed by a foreign law which permits a
settlor to create a protective trust for himself where the
bankruptcy of the settlor is allowed to determine his life interest
and trigger discretionary trusts in favor of himself and his
family.2 14 Under the foreign law there will be valid discretionary
trusts, while under English Law the trustee in bankruptcy will
surely have a life interest in the English assets for the benefit of
the settlor's creditors.
Indeed, public policy considerations favoring creditors are so
strong that it seems likely that if an English trust instrument
expressly excludes the right of the trustee to an indemnity for
expenses and liabilities it incurs, so as to prevent creditors from
having any derivative rights of subrogation against the trust fund
if the worthless trust company cannot pay up, the courts will
ignore such exclusion. 2 15 This also seems likely if a foreign law

212.
213.
214.
215.

See Trusts Law (1996 Revision), § 79 (Cayman Is.).
See Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law 1997, § 7(I) (Cayman Is.).
See, e.g., Belize Trusts Act 1992, § 12(4).
See In re Johnson, 15 Ch.D. 548, (1880).

1999]

ENGLISH FIDUCIARY STANDARDS

597

governs the trust. The Hague Convention on Trusts incorporated
into English Law by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 allows
non-recognition and non-application of the provisions of the
Convention 'when their application would be manifestly
2 16
incompatible with public policy."
To have English trustees hold English assets for English
beneficiaries, 2 17 but to purport to make the trust endure forever
simply by choosing a foreign governing law that has no rule
against perpetuities, is likely to be manifestly incompatible with
public policy. However, if the trust governed by the foreign law
has a perpetuity period no more extensive than a permitted

English period and then provides

a trust or power

of

accumulation coextensive with such foreign period, but larger
than the twenty-one-year accumulation period permitted by
English law, the English court probably will not reduce the
foreign accumulation period.
Perpetuity and accumulation
periods were coextensive in British jurisdictions until the
Accumulations Act of 1800 reduced the accumulation period for
England, but other jurisdictions like Ireland and the Isle of Man
were unaffected. The Law Commission recently recommended
that the period should once again be coextensive, since there is
no justification for separating the periods and plenty of
2 18
justification for the periods being coextensive.
One area where the courts will soon be called upon to take a
public policy view involves flee clauses (sometimes known as
"flea" clauses or "grasshopper" clauses because they make the
trust jump from one jurisdiction to another). Clearly, such
clauses can operate to frustrate international and national
measures tackling the laundering of the proceeds of drug2 19
trafficking, of terrorism and of other serious criminal offences.
Thus, the English courts will almost certainly hold flee clauses to
be ineffective where the English authorities take steps against the
trustees in respect of trust assets believed to be laundered assets,
so that the English trustees remain trustees and are not replaced
by Suntopian trustees as provided in the trust instrument.
However, if no trust assets can be found in England, nothing
can be done except to charge the trustees (and perhaps their

216.
217.

Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, ch. 14, sch., art. 18 (Eng.).
The same would apply if Cayman STAR law were chosen so as

purportedly to create a valid non-charitable purpose trust of English assets held
by English trustees, whether or not perpetual.
218.
See LAw CoMMN REPoRT No. 251, supranote 192.
219. Two acts that contain such clauses are the Drug Trafficking Act 1994,
ch. 37 (Eng.), and the Criminal Justice Act 1988, ch. 33 (Eng.), amended by
Criminal Justice Act 1993, ch. 36 (Eng.).

598

VANDERBILT JOURNVAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:555

advisors) with any appropriate criminal offenses. 2 20 Normally,
the assets are held outside the trustees' jurisdiction (although
some underlying assets may perhaps be traced to such
jurisdiction) so that the crucial issue is whether the "asset
jurisdiction" recognizes as trustees the English trustees or the
Suntopian trustees. International action seems necessary to
make flee clauses ineffective to the extent that they interfere with
the administration of justice, although national measures could
make it a crime for a trustee to accept trusteeship of a trust
containing a flee clause purporting to make the trust fund free
from attack by the relevant law enforcement authorities.
C. Tennination of Trusts
A trust may terminate naturally upon expiration of its
prescribed duration (e.g., for A for life, remainder to B or to
accumulate the income for a valid perpetuity and accumulation
period and then to distribute the capital equally per stirpes
between the descendants of the settlor). A trust of particular
property may terminate prematurely to the extent that such
property is the subject matter of the exercise of a settlor's power
of revocation or of a fiduciary or personal donee's power to
transfer or appoint trust property to persons absolutely or as
trustees for others.
Where beneficiaries of full capacity are between themselves
(whether concurrently or consecutively) collectively the absolute
equitable owners of property held in trust for them, they can
prematurely terminate the trust if they all agree, even if the
settlor wanted the trust to continue for a longer period for some
material purpose for which he created the trust.2 2 ' The

220. Bankers, lawyers, and accountants who suspect they are assisting the
laundering of proceeds of criminal conduct commit an offence unless they tip off
the authorities (but not the client). "Criminal conduct" means conduct which
would constitute an offence if it had occurred in England, Wales, or Scotland. See
Criminal Justice Act, 1993, ch. 36, § 29 (Eng.). On a narrow view, this does not
cover defrauding a foreign revenue authority, but the English Government takes
the broader view that defrauding the revenue authority is the relevant conduct,
and defrauding the English national revenue authority would be criminal. Cf. R.
v. Chief Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1204 (Q.B.) (granting
extradition to Norway of a Norwegian convicted of crimes connected with evading

Norwegian taxes).

221.
Saunders
Cas. 186;
(1876); In
court on

See Stephenson v. Barclays Bank Trust Co., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 882 (Ch.);
v. Vautier, [1841] Cr. & Ph. 240; Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] App.
In re Smith, [1928] Ch. 915; Hunt-Foulston v. Furber, 3 Ch. D. 285
re Bowes, [1896] 1 Ch. 507. Under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958, the
behalf of persons "who cannot themselves give their approval" (e.g.,

because unborn), can approve arrangements varying trusts even if contrary to the
wishes of the settlor. See Goulding v. James, [1997] 2 All E.R. 239.
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justification for this position is that by transferring the property
to trustees, the settlor divested himself of all beneficial ownership
in the property. The trustees then carry out his purposes until
such time as beneficiaries of full capacity become collectively
beneficial owners of the property. As the collective absolute
property owner, the beneficiaries can then absolutely decide for
themselves their purposes for the trustees to implement, for
example, transferring to each of them his proportionate share as
absolute legal owners matching the absolute equitable ownership
of each. Purported restraints imposed by the settlor on the use

an absolute owner makes of the absolutely owned property are

222
rejected as repugnant to the concept of absolute ownership.
Thus, a settlor simply must take care not to create vested
absolute deferred interests but to create contingent interests.
Take the case of a testator, T, who had founded a family company
of which at his death his second child, B, is the managing
director with a twenty-six percent shareholding. By his will T
bequeaths his own fifty-one percent shareholding to B as trustee
to hold and manage it for the benefit of T's unbusinesslike other
children A, C, and D equally, such shareholding not to be sold
until B sells his own shareholding or retires as managing director
or dies, whichever first occurs. Here, if A, C, and D want their
fifty-one percent shareholding to be transferred to themselves so
they can sell it then, if all are of full capacity, they can insist on
this transfer out of spite, so as to sell the company to an outsider
and frustrate the settlor's purposes. Those purposes would have
been achieved if the interests of A, C, and D had been made
contingent on being alive on the occurrence of the first of the
three specified events, with their issue to take per stirpes the
share the parent would have taken if surviving until such time.
Intriguingly, if A, C, and D were not unanimous so that, say,
only D wanted his proportionate seventeen percent share, the
English court would probably not apply the normal "aliquot
principle" that someone entitled to a specific fraction of assets
(other than land or mortgage debts) is entitled to have an amount
of assets representing such fraction to be transferred to him.
2 23
Exceptional circumstances would preclude such entitlement.
There is the settlor's material purpose coupled with the fact that
a seventeen percent shareholding and the remaining thirty-four

percent shareholding in a private company are not worth onethird

and

two-thirds

respectively

of

a

fifty-one

percent

222. See Gosling v. Gosling, [1859] John 265; Weatherall v. Thornburgh, 8
Ch. D. 261, 270 (1878); In re Dugdale, 38 Ch. D. 176 (1888); Metcalfe v. Metcalfe,
43 Ch. D. 633 (1889).
223. See Crowe v. Appleby, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1539 (Ch.); In re Weiner, [1956]
1 W.L.R. 579 (Ch.); Lloyds Bank v. Duker, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1324 (Ch.).
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shareholding, so that the conduct of D in cutting off his nose to
spite his face should not be allowed to have a detrimental effect
on the interests of A and C which the testator would not have
intended.
Just as this exception to the "aliquotprinciple" has developed
in the twentieth century, the House of Lords could have some
scope to develop an exception to the collective termination rights
of beneficiaries where necessary to give effect to a material
purpose of the settlor-testator. However, the House of Lords is
unlikely to be prepared to make inroads into such a wellestablished principle of property law. 2 2

Presumably, they would

not allow an English settlor of English assets for English
beneficiaries to evade this fundamental principle merely by
choosing, as the law governing the trust, the law of an American

State which does not allow termination if it would defeat a
material purpose of the settlor.
D. Problemsin CreatingProperValid Trusts
1. Certainty of Subject Matter
No problems arise if a settlor, S, gratuitously declares himself
to hold a particular asset of his in trust for himself as to one
quarter and for B as to three quarters. What if, instead, he
declares that he holds twenty cases of Chateau Lafite or twenty
gold bars or twenty tons of gravel or twenty gallons of petrol or
£20 or twenty shares in XYZ Co. Ltd. in trust for B, when S owns
eighty units of the relevant assets and has not separated twenty
units from the rest of the units? In the case of contracts for the
sale of unascertained goods out of a larger pool of goods owned
by the vendor, statute can intervene where the purchase price
has been paid so as to treat the vendor as having an intention to
hold the pool on trust for himself and the purchaser in
proportionate shares as equitable tenants in common. 225 Equity
cannot, however, treat S's intention to become trustee of twenty
units out of a pool of eighty units as effective until the twenty
units have been separated from the rest, S not intending
forthwith to become an equitable tenant in common with B, but

224.
225.

See Rhone v. Stephens, [1994] 2 App. cas. 310.
See Sale of Goods Amendment Act 1995, ch. 28, § 1(3) (protecting

purchasers who have paid the purchase price against the insolvency of the
vendor).
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intending B to be sole equitable owner of twenty units.2 2 6 While S
may intend B to become immediately sole equitable owner of
twenty units, this is legally impossible before segregation of such
units from the remaining units. As Lord Mustill said, "[iut makes
no difference what the parties intended if what they intend is
impossible, as is the case with an immediate transfer of [legal and
227
equitable] title to goods whose identity is not yet known."
Most surprisingly, in Hunter v. Moss 228 the Court of Appeal

upheld a gratuitous declaration of trust of fifty shares in MEL for B
where S was legal owner of 950 shares on the basis that "justas a
person can give, by will a specified number of his shares in a
specified company, so equally he can declare himself a trustee of
fifty of his shares in MEL, and that is effective to give a beneficial
229
proprietary interest to the beneficiary under the trust."

This crucially overlooks a fundamental distinction between
inter vivos and testamentary dispositions. By dying, a testator
does everything necessary to divest himself of all his legal and
beneficial title in all his assets in favor of his executor, who is
then obliged to implement his testamentary dispositions after
payment of debts, expenses and taxes. In his lifetime, a settlordonor only divests himself of his beneficial entitlement to his
assets when he has done everything necessary to identify those
assets in which he has relinquished his beneficial interest. If S,
the legal owner of 950 shares, wants to hold fifty on trust for B
alone (rather than 950 on trust for S and B as equitable tenants
in common as to eighteen nineteenths and one nineteenth), he
should send his share certificate to the registrar of the company
requesting that he be issued share certificates for nine hundred
shares and for fifty shares.
A true analogy with the testamentary position would have
arisen if S had declared himself trustee of fifty shares for B and of
the remaining nine hundred shares for C. Here S has divested
himself of all his beneficial interest in favor of B and C, who
collectively, under the principle of Saunders v. Vautier,230 can
terminate the trust for themselves and require S to send the 950-

226. See In re Goldcorp Exch. Ltd., [1995] 1 App. Cas. 74 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from N.Z.); Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd, [19951 1 All E.R. 192 (Ch.); In re
London Wine Co. Shippers, [1986] Palmer's C.C. 121.
227. Goldcorp, [1995] 1 App. Cas. at 90.
228. [1994] 1 W.L.R. 452 (C.A.). The decision was criticized in David
Hayton, Uncertainty of Subject-Matter of Thists, 110 LAW Q. REv. 335 (1994), but
followed at first instance by Neuberger J. in In re Harvard Securities, [1997] 2
BCLC 369, on the basis that the law relating to intangibles is different from that
relating to tangibles, although accepting that Australian law was contrary to
Hunter v. Moss.
229. Hunter, [1994] 1 W.L.R. at 459.
230. 4 Beav. 115 (1841).
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share certificate and a share transfer form to the company
registrar, so that B and C become legal registered shareholders of
fifty and nine hundred shares respectively.
Hunter v. Moss arguably was incorrectly decided, so that S
cannot create a valid trust simply by declaring he holds fifty
shares for B or £50 for C where at that time S was owner of one
hundred shares or had £100 in his bank account. 2 3 1 If correctly

decided, it leads to convenient results 232 in the share markets
where a custodian purchases shares for itself and its customers,
allocating numbers to each, or where a person purports to sell or
declare a trust of a certain number of shares forming part of a
larger shareholding.
However, even ff incorrectly decided, the application of
correct principles should not lead to inconvenient results in the
share markets. After all, except for shares in private companies
as in Hunter v. Moss, S will normally not be a registered
shareholder with legal title to shares. Where Nominee plc is a
registered shareholder of ten million shares in Bigg plc and SubCustodian plc is interested in two million of such shares, out of
which it sells 100,000 shares to S, S has an equitable interest as
tenant in common with a one-twentieth equitable interest in SubCustodian's interest in one-fifth of Nominee's interest, so having a
one-hundredth equitable interest. If S then purports to sell, or to
declare himself trustee of "50,000 of my Bigg plc shares," this is a
legal nonsense because in the stock market the system prevents
S from becoming legal or equitable owner of 50,000 Bigg shares.
It must surely follow that S must be understood to have intended
to sell, or to have declared himself trustee of, one-twentieth of his
interest in Sub-Custodian's interest or one-hundredth of his
interest in Nominee's shareholding: he can only sell, or declare
trusts of, what he actually has and must be taken to intend to
deal with what he has.
Essentially, S's interest is merely a book entry or computer
entry in the books of Sub-Custodian plc, so that the courts will
likely consider equitable title to pass merely by such entry rather
than fall within the formalities requirement of Law of Property Act
1925 section 53(1)(c), "a disposition of an equitable interest
subsisting at the time of the disposition, must be in writing
signed by the person disposing of the same, or by his agent

231.
350.

Cf. Mac-Jordan Constr. Ltd. v. Brookmount Erostin Ltd, [1992] BCLC

232.

See Ho v. Chan (unreported decision of Yuen J. in Hong Kong High

Court, Dec. 17, 1998, accepting Hunter v. Moss).
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thereunto lawfully authorised in writing or by will."23 3 It is
unfortunate that Parliament when disapplying section 53(l)(c) for
transfers of securities within the CREST system did not go
further. 2 34 For the present, reliance must be placed on the

argument that joining and leaving a class of co-owners in a pool

2 35
of assets should fall outside section 53(1)(c).
The pool of assets approach also avoids certainty problems
where a custodian buys 15,000 shares in XYZ plc, intending to
buy 9,000 for itself, 4,000 for B, and 2,000 for C. No problem
arises if the custodian allocates 6,000 shares for B and C to a
larger segregated pool of such shares held for clients as equitable
tenants in common in proportionate shares. 2 36 Where, however,
the custodian in breach of its obligations under the Financial
Services Act regime does not separate fungible assets into those
that are its own and those that are its clients, but where the
clients accept that their assets are pooled or that the nature of
the asset requires this (as where the custodian is a sub-custodian
with an equitable interest), then the pool of fungible assets
should be regarded as belonging proportionately to the providers
of the purchase money in the proportions that the shares they
purchased bear to each other.

2. The Constitution of Trusts
In Re Pagarini2 37 the Court of Appeal of the British Virgin
Islands held that no trust arose where shortly before his death the
deceased said "I give all my wealth to the Foundation" (a trust he
had set up a little earlier) and then instructed his accountant, Mr.
Param, to transfer all his wealth to the trustees of the Foundation.
The court held that "wealth," comprising the patrimony owned after

payment of debts, was an inchoate concept not capable of
ascertainment and so not capable of being gifted. 2 3 8 It further held
that the intention to make a gift precluded the circumstances from
constituting a declaration of the setflor as himself trustee, and that

233.

Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 53(i)(c) (Eng.). See

the pragmatic approach in Vandervell v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1967] 2 App.
Cas. 291 (a helpful decision for stock markets).
234.
See Uncertificated Sec. Regulations, S. I. 1995, No. 73, § 32(5). Section
53(l)(c) is disapplied to transfers of gilt-edged securities through the Central Gilts
Office by Stock Transfer Act 1982, ch. 41, § 1(2).
235. Becoming, and ceasing to be, a member of an unincorporated society is
regarded as outside § 53(1)(c). Ashby v. Blackwell & Million Bank (1765) Amb.
503; Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden, [19621 Ch. 832; In re Bucks Constabulary
Fund (No. 2), [1979] 1 W.L.R. 936.
236.
R: v. Clowes (No. 2), [1994] 2 All E.R. 316, 325-27 (C.A.).
237.
[1998/99] 2 O.F.L.R. 1.
238.
See id.
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the fact that the administrator owning the deceased's estate was
one of the trustees and that relevant shares had been registered,
on the initiative of the directors, in the names of trustees of the
23 9
Foundation did not perfect the trust.

The court notably refused to follow two English High Court
cases: Re James,24 0 a case that erroneously extended the Strong
v. Bird 2 4 1 principle beyond executors (for whose appointment the
deceased was responsible) to administrators (for whose
appointment the deceased is not responsible), and Re Ralli's
W.T. 24 2 which erroneously extended Re James so that if,
somehow (even by reason of matters wholly extraneous to the
settlor) legal title to property intended to be held in trust happens
to become vested in the intended trustee this perfects the trust of
such property, for example, if the settlor's trustee happens later
to be appointed trustee of the settlor's father's will trusts, so
having title to assets, which are later appointed by the settlor's
mother as donee of a special power and which fall within the
settlor's covenant to transfer to his trustee any such appointed
property. In such circumstances, the better view is that only the
settlor or his authorized agent can perfect a trust by completing a
gift to his trust, so the settlor can choose to keep for himself the
2
property appointed to him. 4

Strong v. Bird is concerned with the rule that an executor
who is a debtor of the testator must account in equity for the
amount of the debt as part of the testator's estate even though at
common law the appointment of the testator's debtor as executor
automatically released the debt because the executor could not
sue himself. Exceptionally, Strong v. Bird laid down that the
executor did not have to account to the estate for the debt if the
testator had manifested an intent to forgive the debt in his
lifetime and this intent had continued until his death. It was
probably a mistake in Re Stewart 244 to extend Strong v. Bird
(which negatively left the position as at common law) so as
positively to justify treating an imperfect lifetime gift as effective in

equity if the intended donee became the donor's executor, with
the intention to give continuing unchanged until death. Equity

239.
See id.
240.
[1935] Ch. 449.
241.
18 L.R.-Eq. 315 (1874).
242. [1964] Ch. 288 (where In re Brooks' Settlement Trusts, [1939] Ch. 993
was overlooked).
243. See In re Brooks' Settlement Trusts, [1939] Ch. 993.
244. [1908] 2 Ch. 251.
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would then have been anchored to fundamental principle and not
2 45
left "adrift and aimless."
3. Proper Trust or Sham Trust in Form
Leaving aside whether, as a question of fact, in substance a
trust is run by the settlor and not by the trustees, the question

arises, as a matter of law, whether the provisions in the trust
instrument really have the effect that the underlying beneficial
interest remains in the settlor so that the trustee holds the
property as trustee or agent for the settlor absolutely, rather than
for the apparent beneficiaries.
In English law there is a fine line (recognized by the Revenue
in the taxation of capital gains of trusts) 24 6 between a trustee
holding property to the order of the settlor as sole beneficiary and
a trustee holding to the order of the settlor only if the settlor
orders it and until then on trust for various beneficiaries. 24 7 An
example of the former trust for the settlor, S, is where T holds
property in trust during S's lifetime to pay the income or capital
to S, or at his direction, and after his death, to hold the capital
equally for S's children or for such of S's relatives in such shares
as S may designate in signed writing in his lifetime or by will.
Since S has the full equitable ownership, the purported
disposition of the capital after his death is a testamentary
disposition requiring compliance with the detailed formalities of
the Wills Act of 1837.24
If, however, S had divested himself of his beneficial
ownership by having T hold the property on fixed or discretionary
trusts for various beneficiaries, but had reserved to himself a
power of revocation or a general power of appointment, then T
would hold on proper trusts for the beneficiaries and not to the
order of T until T chose to exercise his power, which would
require T to do as ordered by S.249 Such powers have adverse tax
consequences in England, and in most jurisdictions expose the
trust fund to claims of creditors, spouses, heirs, and other
dependants. In these jurisdictions, powers to appoint to the

245. RODERICK PITr MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 740
(3d ed. 1992).
246.
Trusts to the order of the settlor as sole beneficiary are taxed
differently from proper trusts for beneficiaries. See Taxation of Chargeable Gains
Act 1992, ch. 12, §§ 5, 60(2), 70 (Eng.).
247.
See David Hayton, When is a Trust not a Trust?, 1 J. INTL TR. & CORP.
PLAN. 3 (1992); UNDERHILL & HAYTON, supra note 96, at 46.
248.
See, e.g., Re Pfrimmer [1936] 2 D.L.R. 460; Re Beardmore Trusts [1952]
1 D.L.R. 41; Anderson v. Patton [1948] 2 D.L.R. 202, 203-08 (Parlee J.A.,
dissenting).
249.
See Young v. Sealey, [1949] Ch. 278, 284, 294.
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settlor are vested in trustees who are usually authorized to have
exclusive regard to the settlor's interests (thus ignoring the
interests of the beneficiaries or other objects of the power of
appointment), but alternately may be vested in a protector.
One needs not only to consider the main beneficial provisions
of the trust instrument but also the effect of clauses excluding
traditional rights of beneficiaries. After all, if the beneficiaries
have no rights, then the trustees owe no duties to any
beneficiaries 25 0 and so must owe their duties to the settlor (or to
no one, so as to be absolute beneficial owners), albeit empowered,
until countermanded by the settlor, to benefit the beneficiaries,
recharacterized as objects of powers with the property held on
resulting trust for the settlor who alone has rights against the
trustees.
Would not this be the position if the trust instrument
provided that no accounts are to be provided for the beneficiaries
until the death of the settlor, at which time only are the
beneficiaries to be informed that they are beneficiaries, and at
which time no beneficiary can bring an action for a breach of
trust in respect of any conduct of the trustees during the settlor's
lifetime? Does this not mean that the settlor is the beneficial
owner of income and capital held to his order, so that the rights
of the beneficiaries arising only on his death are obtained under a
testamentary disposition requiring compliance with the Wills Act
1837 if the instrument is to be effective? On the other hand, a
provision that the trustees are not to be liable for any conduct
requested or instigated by the settlor essentially means that the
trust fund is held to the settlor's order only if he orders it.
Finally, while accountability of trustees to the beneficiaries is
crucial to the existence of a proper trust 25 1 (as made clear in
Armitage v. Nurse),2 52 continuous accountability is not necessary.
It is sufficient that there be retrospective accountability
ultimately to some beneficiary. Thus, one can create confidential
"blackhole trusts," although in England only for the twenty-oneyear accumulation period and any extra period of minority
provided for in section 31 of the Trustee Act 1925.
E. "BlackholeTrusts"
Settlors and trustees can exploit the position of
confidentiality and secrecy to the limit in a "blackhole trust." A
250.

As a result, there can be no trust for the "beneficiaries" as emphasized

by Millett L.J. in Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241, 253 (C.A.).
251. This requirement does not extend to charitable purpose trusts
enforceable by the Attorney General or the Charity Commissioners.

252.

[1998] Ch. at 253.
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trust is set up (e.g., under Jersey law) for a valid perpetuity and
accumulation period of one hundred years and the income is
directed to be accumulated throughout the period, upon the
expiration of which the capital is to be distributed to the youngest
then-living descendant of X born after eighty-two years have
elapsed from creation of the trust.25 3 However, upon expiration
of the hundred-year period, if no such descendant of X exists,
then the capital is to be distributed among such charitable
companies (incorporated in, say, Barbados after the said eightytwo years and operating in such jurisdiction at the end of the
hundred-year period) as the trustees shall select in their absolute
discretion, but only to the extent that capital has not been
distributed by the trustees under a power of appointment in favor
of any descendants of X at any time before the expiration of the
hundred-year period. There is both a power to add to this class
of object of a power any person (other than the settlor, his
spouse, and the trustees) nominated in writing to the trustees by
any adult object or by the settlor, and a power to delete any
object from the class of objects.
The objects are expressly excluded from having any right to
be informed that they are objects, 2 54 while the trustees have a
power to create a structure (e.g., British Virgin Island
international business companies or Liechtenstein Anstalts)
enabling property appointed by them to an object to reach such
object by indirect means, thus ensuring that the object does not
learn of the trust. Of course, a further provision excludes the
objects (if, somehow, they learn they are objects) from having any
right to see the trust instrument, trust accounts, or the letter of

wishes. 255

253. Contingent beneficiaries (even, it seems, if the contingency is as remote
as some of the far-fetched possibilities taken into account by Equity for the
purposes of the rule against remoteness of vesting) are entitled under the general
law to see the trust accounts, In re Tillott, [1892] 1 Ch. 86; Attorney-General of
Ontario v. Stavro (1995) 119 D.L.R. (4th) 750, so descendants born in the first

eighty-two years are excluded from such category.
254. Often objects (e.g., the settlor's issue but not employees of the settlor's
companies who are also objects) will be intended by the settlor to have such right,
but such right can be excluded, with the beneficiary-trustee right-duty
relationship sufficing on its own for a valid trust. See In re Manisty's Settlement,
[19741 Ch. 17, 25; Armitage v. Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241, 253 (C.A.); Hayton, supra
note 102.
255.
This reinforces Lord Hodson's dicta in McPhail v. Doulton, [1971] App.
Cas. 424, 441, that "[t]he trust in default controls and he to whom the trust
results in default of exercise of the power is in practice the only one competent to
object to a wrongful exercise of the power by the donee," and the view of Evershed
MR in In re Greaves, [1954] Ch. 434, 447 (C.A.), that "[t]he only relevant duty
which he [the donee] owes is to the persons designated by the donor of the power
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In the recitals to the trust instrument, the settlor, X, recites
both his intention to create a true trust in form and in substance
and his appreciation that while the existence of a company can
clearly be established by registration, this is not true of a trust.
He also recites his intent that after expiration of the hundredyear period, his trustees will be made to account for their
stewardship of the trust assets by his youngest descendant (not
ascertainable until the expiration of the hundred year period and
not in existence, at the earliest, until eighty-two years have
elapsed) or, otherwise, by those recently incorporated charitable
companies then in existence who receive the capital. To make
this clear, provisions in the main body of the trust instrument
will require the accounts to be audited annually by ABC
Accountants and placed in a safety deposit box in the vaults of
Megabank plc and that apart from payment of their fee for such
services, the trustees are to pay £100 p.a. to ABC Accountants
and to Megabank plc as beneficiaries having all the usual rights
as beneficiaries for the duration of the trust. Finally, X recites
that his intention is for the trustees to distribute all the capital
(by exercising their power of appointment) before expiration of the
one hundred-year period as is normally intended for most
discretionary trusts, but even if this happens the trustees should
deliver the accounts to his descendant who would otherwise have
received the capital, or in default of such defendant, to the state
official responsible for charities.
As a matter of form, this is a true trust under which the
settlor is excluded from benefiting, so it cannot be regarded as a
sham trust of assets held for the settlor until he orders otherwise.
Meanwhile, the involvement of ABC Accountants and Megabank
should serve to give substance to the trust (assuming they are
informed of the trust so the trustees use their services and pay
them £100 p.a. as beneficiary).
"Methinks the settlor doth protest too much" in such
artificial creation may be an understandable reaction, but the
counter-argument is that the apparently artificial structure is
necessary to give substance to the settlor's real intentions (to
protect, preserve, and develop his family nest-egg in the best
interests of his dynasty as he sees it, wanting his descendants to
work hard and not be "trustafarians" or "trust babes"
concentrating their energies on getting money out of the trustees)
with sufficient substance given to the artificial structure to
ensure that a true trust exists.

to take in default'of appointment," so the fraud on a power doctrine does not
apply to releases of powers.
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When the settlor and the trust company have gone to such
lengths, using the services of learned Chancery counsel and
relying on his opinion, it is likely indeed that the trust company

will consciously exercise its discretion, minute its deliberations
and decisions, and keep proper accounts so that the trust should
not be regarded as in substance a sham. Indeed, the precautions
of involving ABC Accountants and Megabank as beneficiaries
throughout the one hundred years need not be taken; designating
an individual throughout the period with a current right to make
the trustees account is not required. Accountability at some
stage, if only at the end of the trust period, suffices as where
income is accumulated throughout and the capital with
accumulations is subsequently to be distributed to a person
satisfying a contingency at the end of the period and
unascertainable until then; or where a politician or anti-fraud
official transfers his portfolio of shares to trustees to administer
it, keeping him in the dark until he ceases to be Chief Finance
Minister or a Cabinet Minister or Chief of the Serious Fraud
office.
Of course, if ABC Accountants and Megabank are not
involved, or even if only Megabank is involved, there is scope for
the trustee to be dishonest and to appropriate all the trust
property for himself once the settlor has died and then to fail to
tell the ultimate default beneficiary of the trust. Thus the settlor
may wish to have a protector to monitor the trust accounts and
look after the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries.2 5 6 Even
where the trustee acts properly, the "blackhole trust7 helps put
the beneficial ownership into suspense or abeyance for the
lengthy trust period and makes life difficult for revenue

authorities and for creditors of objects of the trust. Purpose
trusts may also be exploited for the same purposes. Hence, there
are no plans to introduce legislation to validate non-charitable
purpose trusts in English law, for example, where there is an
"enforcer" named in the trust instrument 25 7 or an "interested"

person.25S

256. An interesting question is whether to avoid the risks inherent in
"blackhole trusts" legislation should require trustees to account to a minimum of
two or three objects of full capacity whenever no beneficiary of full capacity
subsists. See REVIEW OF FINANCiAL REGuLATION IN THE CROWN DEPENDENCIES, 1998

Cmnd. 4109, ch. 12.
257. As in Jersey under its Trusts (Amendment No. 3) Jersey Law 1996 and
the Isle of Man under its Purpose Trusts Act 1996.
258. As in Bermuda under its Trusts (Special Provisions) Amendment Act
1998.
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